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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a market-based approach to takeover defenses.  In this 
framework, a firm’s decision to go public without defenses is considered a decision to 
produce an unshielded target.  The paper shows that the voluminous classical literature 
on takeover defenses, which argues either that takeover defenses are good for all firms 
or that they are bad for all firms, actually ignores both supply and demand 
considerations.  Recent empirical findings that revealed that IPO-stage firms diverge in 
antitakeover practices led to the rapid development of a new branch in the literature.  
This branch emphasizes that firms diverge in defense-adopting costs due to the 
heterogeneous characteristics of the “producers,” meaning that the literature now 
acknowledges supply-side considerations. The literature still overlooks, however, 
demand-side considerations, which are highlighted in this paper.  The paper argues that 
bidder propensity to pay is related to the number of firms that go public without 
defenses. As a result of takeover diversion from shielded targets to unshielded targets, 
the fewer the number of firms that produce unshielded targets, the higher the price that 
the market will pay for unshielded firms.  Finally, the existing supply-side explanations 
merge with the novel demand-side argument to form a full picture of the market for 
takeover defenses, which serves to explain the findings of recent empirical studies that 
have been so puzzling to corporate scholarship up until now. 
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper advocates a new market-based framework to analyze takeover 
defenses. While takeovers and takeover defenses are among the most heavily 
discussed topics in corporate law and corporate finance, the literature never 
emerged as an organized, coherent body.  The first purpose of the proposed 
framework is to create a systematic setup that exposes the fact that the existing 
literature provides only partial answers to the mysteries of takeover defense 
practices. Second, and more importantly, the new approach of this framework 
seeks to develop a novel theory of takeover defenses that supplements existing 
theories.  Consolidating the theories, the unified framework could solve 
previously unanswered questions and shed light on empirical puzzles. 
As with any other product market, I suggest that the market for takeover 
defenses consists of products, suppliers, and buyers.  To simplify, there are two 
types of “products” in this marketplace, the first being a firm without takeover 
defenses, or an unshielded target, and the second being a firm with takeover 
defenses, or a shielded firm.  The producers are the controllers of the 
corporation at the time takeover defenses are considered, in particular prior to 
the initial public offering (“IPO”).  Thus, the article treats the decision to go 
public without takeover defenses as a decision to produce an unshielded target.  
The supply of unshielded targets is, hence, the result of the joint decision of 
multiple producers. Finally, the third component of the market for takeover 
defenses is buyers, who are potential acquirers for both shielded and unshielded 
targets.  Since takeover defenses make a target more elusive, shielded products 
are more expensive, but their individual business features may nonetheless 
appeal to some buyers.  Consequently, there is a different level of demand, i.e., 
willingness to pay, for shielded and unshielded targets. 
The first wave of articles that followed the emergence of takeover defenses 
in the 1980s was led by Easterbrook and Fischel, who were against such 
mechanisms, on the one side, and Lipton, heading the proponents’ camp, on the 
other side.  In these articles and the many others to follow, takeover defenses 
were described as either harmful or beneficial to all firms.1 As we shall see 
below, from a demand-and-supply point of view, these arguments imply a fairly 
degenerated market for takeover defenses, a market in which all producers 
should either decide to produce unshielded targets or only to produce shielded 
targets.2
1 Another line of argument is that some mild level of antitakeover protection is 
warranted.  See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender 
Offers, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028-56 (1982) (arguing for target’s managers’ ability to seek 
competing bids and for allowing them the necessary delay to achieve this goal); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 
Stan. L. Rev. 23-50 (1982) (same); but cf. Ronald Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus 
Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defenses, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 52, 66 (1982) (stressing the 
benefits of competing bids but insisting on the passivity of the target’s management). 
2 In economic terms and as will be graphically outlined below, one could say that both 
demand and supply are completely (infinitely) elastic.  See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 32-35 (6th ed., 2005) (defining and discussing elasticity). 
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More nuanced theories emerged through the years, which claimed that 
different firm characteristics make defenses useful for some firms and harmful 
for others.  This branch of the literature has received a boost since the 
appearance of a recent new line of enlightening empirical papers regarding 
adoption of takeover defenses at the IPO stage, which show that firms sharply 
diverge in their decisions regarding takeover defenses. Exemplifying this, one 
theory posits that takeover defenses grant managers discretion, which can 
sometimes be beneficial to the shareholders.  Managers can use this discretion 
to determine the timing of the sale of the company and the method of sale and, 
if a hostile bidder emerges, to negotiate the price or put off the bid in 
anticipation of another bid.3 However, not all firms require this level of 
managerial discretion.4 For instance, in market sectors that experience frequent 
takeover activity, competition amongst bidders may drive prices up and 
dissipate the benefits of managerial discretion. 
This theory and the remaining theories that concentrate on dissimilarities 
among firms evoke a richer picture of the market for takeover defenses, 
especially its supply side. These explanations imply that firms differ in the cost 
of producing an unshielded target.  Some firms have features that make 
defenses particularly valuable to them, and therefore the cost to them of 
producing an unshielded target is high.  Those firms, the argument goes, are the 
ones most likely to adopt defenses.  For instance, following the example above, 
firms in market sectors that do not enjoy much takeover activity can take 
advantage of takeover defenses and should therefore most certainly go public 
with defenses. Conversely, firms in takeover-frequent environments receive 
high premiums even in the absence of defenses and should therefore 
unhesitatingly refrain from adopting them when going public. 
The results of recent empirical studies regarding antitakeover charter 
provisions in IPO-stage firms, however, did not support most existing theories 
and presented a puzzle to corporate law scholars.5 Firms mysteriously diverge 
in their defense-adoption practices; while some companies adopt harsh and 
effective antitakeover charter provisions, others refrain from such provisions 
altogether.6 One commentator recently formulated the challenge to traditional 
corporate law as follows: “Standing alone, Lipton’s position would suggest all 
companies should adopt defenses prior to an IPO, and Easterbrook & Fischel’s 
position would suggest that no firm should adopt a defense; yet, in reality, 
about half do and half do not.” Moreover, the firms in these studies that had 
opted for takeover defenses did not possess the special features identified by the 
 
3 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover 
Charter Provisions as Pre-Commitment, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 473, 484 (2003). 
4 Id. at 488-89 (“[T]he optimal allocation of decision-making power depends on 
several empirical factors that may vary from company to company to company … . For that 
reason, different companies may make different choices … .”). 
5 See John C. Coates, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the 
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO 
Charters Maximize Firm Value?, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83-120 (2001); Laura C. Field & 
Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857 (2002). 
6 Coates, supra note 1, at 1307. 
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literature as making defenses of particular value to a firm. 
Following these results, researchers proposed a number of theories of 
market failure that provide alternative explanations for the adoption of takeover 
defenses.7 A common theme of many of these theories is the rejection of the 
classic notion that the IPO-certification process achieves optimal corporate 
governance results.8 In terms of this article’s framework, these theories 
implicitly reject the idea that supply-and-demand forces in the market for 
takeover defenses determine the proportion of firms that adopt defenses. Thus, 
one study suggests that the market does not price the costs of an antitakeover 
provision, and therefore, IPO-stage firms can often get away with adopting 
detrimental takeover defenses that protect managers from takeovers, at the 
expense of the public shareholders.  A second study suggests that firms fail to 
select the optimal tactics due to biased legal counsel.  Finally, a third study 
suggests that some pre-IPO firms have dominant managers who select takeover 
defenses at the expense of the pre-IPO shareholders.9
In contrast to these new ideas, this article argues that the seminal notion 
that IPO-stage firms select optimal governance terms may still hold.10 But a 
richer view of the market for antitakeover defenses than was proposed so far 
must be developed.  Although the literature focused on what I call supply-side 
considerations (or the cost of producing an unshielded target), it gave almost no 
consideration to demand-side factors. And since the empirical papers, too, did 
not account for demand-side considerations, it is not surprising that they failed 
to uncover any rational pattern of behavior on the part of the issuers. 
Demand-side considerations emphasize the “price” that the market is 
willing to pay for an unshielded target.  The implied assumption throughout the 
enormous body of takeover literature is that the market price for unshielded 
firms does not fluctuate with the number of firms on the market that adopt 
 
7 E.g., Daines & Klausner, supra note 5 (raising the possibility of market mispricing 
of takeover defenses); Field & Karpoff, supra note 5 (claiming that lax monitoring of 
managers prior to the IPO stage leads to detrimental adoption of takeover defenses). 
8 This classic notion is attributed to the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling.  
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 305-60 (1976).  Note that some 
recent papers have raised novel explanations that do not suggest that the IPO stage fails to 
yield optimal governance terms.  For one such paper, see Lynn Stout, Do Antitakeover 
Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Ante / Ex Post Valuation Problem, 55 Stan. 
L. Rev. 845 (2002) (arguing that takeover defenses encourage non-shareholder groups to 
make extra-contractual investments in corporate team production). Other papers are 
discussed below at length in infra Sections III.B.1 and III.B.3. 
9 The difference between this theory and the first one presented here is that the former 
posits that the public markets price takeover defenses well and know that they are detrimental 
to shareholders.  Therefore, the public shareholders presumably pay less for firms with 
defenses, meaning the pre-IPO shareholders bear all the costs of adopting the takeover 
defenses. 
10 Other theories of takeover defenses, which do not accept the notion that defenses 
stem from a market failure, are discussed below.  These theories recognize that the benefits 
of takeover defenses vary across firms due to a different rationale from the one presented in 
this paper.  See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of 
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 577 (2003); Kahan & Rock,  supra note 3. 
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defenses.  Put differently, firms need not consider the antitakeover practices of 
their peer firms since the market prices every target independently.  Contrary to 
this hidden but pervasive assumption, I argue that the greater the number of 
firms that adopt defenses, the higher the price that the market is willing to pay 
for firms that reject defenses.  The reason for this is that takeover defenses do 
not only prevent takeovers, they also divert takeover activity to unshielded 
targets.  And in terms of demand, the more unshielded firms produced (and, 
therefore, the fewer firms adopting defenses), the lower the price that the 
market is willing to pay for the unshielded product.  Conversely, the fewer the 
number of produced unshielded targets, the higher the price the market will pay 
for each existing unshielded target. 
To understand this takeover diversion argument, which yields a downward 
sloping demand curve, one must first concede that the competition in the 
market for control is far from perfect.11 In this reality of a limited number of 
suitable bidders and limited takeover opportunities, bidders make comparative 
analyses in their decision-making processes.12 Since takeover defenses increase 
the cost of acquisition, the relative degree of antitakeover shields of all relative 
targets must be taken into account.  And, in turn, when targets weigh whether 
takeover defenses should be adopted, they must consider the takeover defenses 
of their peers in order to get a complete picture of their own takeover prospects. 
When most firms are shielded, unshielded targets receive much attention, 
which translates into highly frequent takeovers. The defensive decisions of the 
other firms divert takeover activity, which may, in turn, affect the average 
takeover premium that an unshielded target may reasonably expect.13 Put 
differently, there is a positive externality to the decision to adopt shields.14 
In a sense, this externality argument is close to a well-known diversion-of-
crime argument.15 To illustrate, placing bars on the windows of one’s home 
 
11 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a 
Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 930 (1987) (“The threat of competing bids might 
be insufficient to secure a competitive price because the competition in the market for 
corporate control is far from perfect.”). 
12 This fact was clearly shown by an empirical study that found that termination of a 
planned merger creates vast stock gains for industry rivals, suggesting that industry rivals are 
takeover alternatives and may be purchased once a merger fails.  See Aigbe Akhigbe et al., 
The Source of Gains to Targets and Their Industry Rivals: Evidence Based on Terminated 
Merger Proposals, 29 FIN. MGMT. 101 (2000). 
13 The discussion in this paper relies on the existence of a corporate stagnation effect 
regarding takeover defenses, a phenomenon that I have analyzed elsewhere.  As the empirical 
evidence clearly indicates, seasoned firms that entered the 1990s with defenses do not tend to 
repeal them, but the rest of the mature firm population seldom adopts new defenses.  This 
means that managers are potent enough to maintain defenses in the former type of firm and 
stockholders are potent enough to resist adoption of defenses in the latter type.  See Coates, 
supra note 5, at 1308; Sharon Hannes, The Determinants and Consequences of Corporate 
Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J. Corp. L. 51, 73-81 (2004). 
14 This means that, unlike the hidden assumption in the existing literature, the takeover 
risk to an individual firm is not endogenous to its antitakeover decisions. 
15 Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially 
Optimal Behavior, 11 INT’L J.L. & ECON. 123, 126 (1991) (discussing externalities of 
protection measures taken by potential victims). 
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increases the risk of burglary to one’s neighbors.  However, the externality 
resulting from the adoption of takeover defenses generally constitutes a positive 
externality to “neighboring” firms, at least if shareholders wish to promote 
takeovers. 
Note also that incentive compensation and managerial private interests play 
an important role in the demand-side factors.  This role complements the one 
already acknowledged by the literature.  When takeover defenses grant 
managers the discretion to decide the fate of a takeover bid, managers will 
insist that the bidder compensate them for the loss of any benefit that they 
derive directly or indirectly from their stint as managers.  It is usually assumed, 
however, that even in a friendly acquisition, managers cannot be directly 
compensated to the full extent.16 However, since current managers’ 
compensation usually includes stock-based compensation, the bidder can raise 
the premiums paid to all shareholders in the acquisition to further benefit the 
target’s managers and quell their resistance.  In turn, the argument goes, 
shareholders can calibrate managers’ fractional holdings of the firm, through 
managers’ compensation, to the point where the managers will accept only high 
takeover bids.17 This strategy is a credible commitment to extracting high 
premiums from high-value bidders at the cost of losing bids from low-value 
bidders, which cannot meet the threshold.18 
The demand-side theory carries this argument forward and shows that the 
diversion of takeover bids creates a positive externality for firms without 
takeover defenses. Although these firms do not make the costly commitment to 
extract high takeover premiums from high-value bidders,19 they do enjoy 
diverted bids from shielded peers and, therefore, an intensified takeover 
frequency.  Incentive pay and the desire of managers to be compensated for 
their losses in a takeover event are, thus, taken into account. I will show that the 
demand-side argument as well as additional arguments raised in the literature 
do not hold if bidders can fully compensate managers directly (i.e., without 
raising premiums paid for all shareholders) for their loss of private benefits in 
 
16 I elaborate on this important assumption below. See infra Section III.C.2. 
17 This means that manager self-interest is manipulated to shareholder advantage.  This 
result is prevalent in the principal-agent literature.  See Chain Freshtman, Kenneth L. Judd & 
Ehud Kalai, Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation, 32 Int’l Econ. 
Rev. 551, 551-52 (1991) (a survey of the principal-agent theory in relation to such 
manipulation of agent self-interest for the benefit of the principal); John Vickers, Delegation 
and the Theory of the Firm, 95 Econ. J. 138, 139-43 (1985) (modeling how empowering the 
agent can benefit the principal). 
18 This is the essence of a recent paper by Kahan & Rock.  See Kahan & Rock, supra 
note 10.  In an earlier paper, the same authors showed that the use of incentive pay (such as 
option grants) and other mechanisms can mute the effect of antitakeover mechanisms.  See 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. Ch. L. Rev. 871 (2002).  However, in the more 
recent paper, the authors clarify that shareholders have no interest in muting the effects of 
takeover defenses, but, rather, use them to their advantage as a credible commitment.  Put 
differently, shareholders have no reason to worry about defenses since defenses can be 
manipulated and not because defenses are silenced. 
19 This commitment is costly, as it requires that the firm forego low-value bidders and 
increase levels of incentive pay to its managers. 
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the takeover attempt.20 
Taken together, the demand-side explanation complements the supply-side 
explanations previously raised in the literature to achieve a more profound and 
more realistic picture of the market for corporate control.  This unified 
framework could help to solve the mystery of the diversity of firm-behavior at 
the IPO stage.  Some firms possess features that cause them to derive greater 
benefits from adopting takeover defenses than those garnered by other firms.  
However, there is a further element to understanding which issuers would opt 
for defenses. The more firms adopt defenses, the higher the expected premium 
their unshielded peers can hope for.  In the end, the market for takeover 
defenses reaches a balance at the point where the marginal firm is indifferent to 
the adoption of defenses, since both tactics provide similar benefits. 
The fact that the empirical studies could not find evidence that the adopting 
firms are those possessing the special features that make defenses especially 
valuable should not be taken as a discouraging sign.  Even if the supply-side 
effects were mild or theoretically non-existent, demand-side factors would still 
cause only some of the firms to adopt shields.  Put differently, even if all firms 
are similar in all relevant features, they may diverge in their antitakeover 
decisions.  The reason for this is that even if defenses provide similar benefits 
to all firms, an adoption trend will raise the benefits accruing to unshielded 
firms.  Eventually, at some defenses-to-adoption ratio, the benefits of the two 
strategies will equalize and the market for takeover defenses will maintain this 
ratio. And, in response to recent non-market-based approaches, the divergent 
behavior of IPO-stage firms regarding takeover shields does not necessarily 
point to any market failure. 
The paper progresses as follows. Section II discusses the takeover wave of 
the 1980s and the proliferation of takeover defenses in its wake. This Section 
also briefly reiterates the main traditional arguments, raised in the 1980s in the 
academia in response to the market developments.  Finally, it discusses new 
empirical evidence regarding the diversity of takeover-defense practices of 
IPO-stage firms and the puzzle that such data present to corporate scholars.  
Section III is the heart of the paper, as it describes the market for takeover 
defenses.  It starts by laying out the setup of the market and reframing 
traditional arguments about defenses in market terms.  It then reconstructs 
nuanced arguments in the literature as multiple alternative supply-side 
explanations.  To complement these theories, the Section puts forth the 
demand-side explanation that has not been previously discussed in the 
literature.  This unified setup allows a better understanding of firm behavior.  
Section IV submits a possible explanation for the mechanisms and process that 
evolve and sustain the equilibrium in the market for takeover defenses. Section 
V discusses alternative explanations in the literature, which deviate from the 
concept of the market for takeover defenses, i.e., non-market-based 
explanations. Finally, Section VI concludes the discussion. 
 
20 For a model under which there is no limitation on the amount of direct 
compensation for the loss of private benefits, see Arlen & Talley, supra note 10. 
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II.  Takeover Defenses 
 
A. The Invention of the Poison Pill and Related Developments 
 
The poison pill, the most notorious of all takeover defenses, was devised 
in the 1980s.21 Shareholder consent is not required for management to adopt a 
poison pill, since poison pills are special purpose “shareholder’s rights plans” 
that are initiated as part of the board’s discretion to design and issue new 
securities.22 The terms of those plans, crafted by corporate counsels with the 
intention of fending off unwanted bids, provide that the purchase of a 
specified amount of stock without the board's approval will trigger special 
rights for the incumbent shareholders.23 Once triggered, the poison pill 
allows  a target’s incumbent shareholders to buy either the target's stock (the 
so-called "flip-in" poison pill feature) or the acquirer stock (the so-called 
"flip-over" poison pill feature) at substantially discounted prices.24 The result 
could be a severe dilution in ownership for the hostile acquirer, thus rendering 
the entire acquisition redundant.25 
Poison pills are a relatively new development, but they are not 
sophisticated enough to be considered a new technological achievement. 
They were more of a reaction to the panic created by the 1980s takeover 
wave, in which almost one-third of the Fortune 500 companies faced a hostile 
bid.26 And, unlike a one-time immediate breakthrough, poison pills had to go 
through a long process in which courts learned to accept them. 
 
21 Coates refers to the poison pill as “the most common, controversial, and distinctive 
type of defense.” John C. Coates, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of 
the Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271, 277 (2000).  See also ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 70-71 (1993) (reporting on the 
negative effects of takeover defenses, particularly the poison pill). 
22 See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8 s. 157 (empowering the board of directors to design and 
issue securities). 
23 See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan, reprinted in 
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 58-91 (2d ed., Supp. 2003-4) (description and example of common features of 
a typical poison pill). 
24 A flip-in poison pill is generally a far more potent defense than a poison pill with a 
flip-over feature.  Modern poison pills include both features. See RONALD J. GILSON &
BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 747 (2d ed. 
1998).  
25 See Coates, supranote 21, at 287 n.62 (a detailed explanation of how poison pills 
operate). 
26 See Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for 
Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets, 
1980-90, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 608 (1992).  The takeover phenomenon was known and 
discussed before the 1980s, but no hostile takeover wave had ever been as fierce. The 
"market for corporate control" was famously described much earlier, in the seminal work of 
Henry Manne.  See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (considered the first in-depth academic discussion of the takeover 
phenomenon). 
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At first, in the landmark 1985 Moran decision, the Delaware Court 
allowed the adoption of poison pills by potential targets, but it was unclear 
under what conditions targets could hold on to them.27 And indeed, in the 
1988 Interco decision, the Chancery Court ordered a target to redeem its 
poison pill when faced with a seemingly reasonable tender offer.28 However, 
not long thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court intervened, in Paramount,
and clarified that boards can hold on to a poison pill in almost all 
circumstances.29 Moreover, on other occasions, the Delaware Supreme Court 
stated that management can hold on to a poison pill even if shareholder 
preferences to the contrary are quite apparent.30 Finally, it became clear that 
only in very narrow circumstances would the Court require redemption of a 
poison pill.31 
It is important, however, to understand the limits of the poison pill as a 
defense mechanism.  Poison pills work against accumulation of stock by a 
hostile bidder through a tender offer or otherwise.32 Prior to the poison pill 
era, bidders were able to purchase control stakes and then proceed to replace 
the board of directors and remove the management.  In fact, once enough 
stock had been accumulated, bidders did not need to use formal proceedings 
to manifest their control, and targets’ managements usually resigned 
 
27 See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (first court decision 
finding poison pills legitimate). Commentators debated whether the courts would scrutinize 
boards' decisions to reject hostile bids with the assistance of the poison pill.  See Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is 
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 256-60 (1989) (suggesting 
substantive scrutiny by the courts of any board's decision regarding unsolicited offers to 
purchase the firm).  Cf. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware's Supreme 
Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994) (explaining that the Delaware 
law never intended and will not conduct such substantive scrutiny; in the event of an offer to 
purchase the firm, the board of directors is bound only to certain procedural requirements).  
28 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring 
redemption of a poison pill that could not withstand the proportionality test in the face of a 
non-coercive bid). 
29 Paramount Communications v. Time, 517 A.2d 1140 (1989) (allowing wide 
discretion to the board in upholding a poison pill). See Jeffery N. Gordin, "Just Say Never?" 
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay For Warren 
Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 522-30 (1997) (stating that, in most cases, courts had 
granted boards a very broad mandate as to whether they could reject acquisition offers).   
30 See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 
1995) (allowing managers to maintain a poison pill even after shareholders voted against the 
management and replaced one-third of the directors with bidder proponents).   
31 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
(requiring management to accommodate additional offers once it decides to put the target on 
sale); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) 
(same). 
32 The tender offer mechanism was invented in the 1950s and has become the main tool 
for acquiring shares in control transactions. In contrast to a simple aggregation of single 
purchases in the open market, each with a different price, in a tender offer, the bidder sets a 
time period for the public shareholders to tender their shares, the price at which the bidder is 
interested in buying the company's shares, and the amount it is willing to pay.  See DOUGLAS 
V. AUSTIN & JAY A. FISHMAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT -- THE TENDER OFFER 7-23 
(1970) (describing the tender offer tool and its evolution).   
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immediately.33 The inevitability of their ultimate removal made further 
resistance pointless, even if managers could hang on to their positions for a 
certain period of time until formally removed by the new owner.  Once a 
poison pill is in place, accumulation of stock and the consequent change of 
management are precluded.  However, the poison pill does not impede a 
firm’s voting (or proxy) mechanism.34 The bidder can therefore ask the 
shareholders to vote the bidder’s proponents onto the board, and if successful, 
these directors can move to redeem the poison pill and allow the acquisition.35 
Poison pill designers tried to develop the mechanism further and design a 
poison pill that would overcome the voting mechanism as well, but these pills 
were rejected by the courts.  This was the “dead-hand” poison pill that 
restricted the power to redeem the poison pill to those directors who were 
members of the board at the time of the poison pill's adoption.  The 
sanctioning of such a poison pill by the courts would have eliminated bidders’ 
option to circumvent the poison pill mechanism by appealing to the 
shareholder vote.  With a view to such a consequence, the Delaware courts 
disallowed this type of invincible poison pill.36 
To take advantage of the vote mechanism to circumvent the poison pill, 
the bidder must create a credible commitment to purchase the target’s stock 
after capturing the board. This commitment is necessary to assure the 
shareholders that after prevailing in the vote, the bidder will pay them the 
premiums that convinced them to play along with the bidder and thwart the 
existing management.  The market mechanism that allows for such a 
commitment is a contingent tender offer, which is held in conjunction with a 
proxy fight for the board.37 First, the shareholders are presented with an offer 
and decide whether or not to tender their shares.  However, to avoid 
triggering the poison pill, the tender offer does not consummate at this stage.  
 
33 See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How 
Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 850 (1999).  
34 Gilson argues that the main consequences of Delaware's sanctioning of the poison 
pill are the redirection of takeover activity to the voting route. See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal 
Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2000) 
(arguing that Delaware law prompted bidders to use the voting mechanism of the target firm, 
while foreclosing the ability to purchase stock directly from the target’s shareholders). And, 
indeed, the Delaware Court was always sensitive to managerial interference in the voting 
process.  See Blasius, A.2d at 659 (“The shareholders franchise is the ideological 
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
35 In fact, the existence of this avenue to remove the takeover shields was one of the 
reasons to uphold them in the first place. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373. 
36 Add Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) at least if the 
articles of association do not include authorization for their adoption.  Id. at 1191.  This view 
was adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 
1281 (Del. 1998).  See generally Stephan Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in 
Corporate Law:  The Case of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. Corp. L. 1 (2003) 
(discussing and criticizing the court decision). 
37 See J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulson, Proxy Contests and Corporate 
Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 286 (1998) (describing 
the simultaneous offers to replace the company’s management of the company and to buy the 
company’s shares).   
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Subsequently, and if enough shares are tendered, shareholders vote for the 
board.  If the bidder succeeds in the vote for the board, its newly elected 
proponents redeem the poison pill, leading to the consummation of the 
contingent tender offer. The target’s stock changes hands for the specified 
price, and the takeover is finally accomplished. 38 
The conclusion that emerges from the above discussion is that poison 
pills do not exclude the possibility of a hostile takeover, but they do require 
the bidder to use the target’s proxy mechanism, which entails delays.39 Delay 
is extremely costly for the bidder for at least three important reasons.  First, 
the bidder must rely on the existing market conditions when contemplating 
the acquisition and bid price.  The longer it takes to consummate the 
transaction, the higher the chances that market conditions will shift.40 
Second, for as long as the takeover battle drags on, it consumes precious 
managerial attention.  Delay therefore prevents the bidder’s management 
from returning to normal business life.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, delay fosters competition, and the bidder certainly does not want 
to lose its prey to a third-party bidder.41 
It was therefore to be expected that targets’ boards would be eager to 
foster delay and thereby intensify the impact of the poison pill.42 If managers 
 
38 This joint vote and tender offer also assists shareholders in overcoming strategic 
tendering, which could hurt the entire shareholder group.  Thus, it precludes coercive bids 
that are designed to pressure and absorb shareholder value.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1695 (1985) (describing the problem of coercive bids); Bebchuk, supra note 11 (same).  In 
addition, uninformed shareholders may find it difficult to decide whether to vote for or 
against their own managerial team.  The offered price in the contingent tender offer as 
compared to the pre-bid price of the firm’s stock may help the shareholders to reach a 
decision.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in 
Contests for Corporate Control (NBER Working Paper No. W8633, 2001), available at 
http://Papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=293246 (highlighting the advantages of 
the joint mechanism vis-à-vis pure proxy contests or pure tender offers). 
39 In addition, proxy solicitation involves expenses, but in most takeover battles, this 
cost is negligible. See Catherine M. Daily et al., Institutional Investor Activism: Follow the 
Leaders? (SSRN Working Paper Series No. 10299, 1997), available at http:// 
Papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=10299 (discussing the cost of proxy 
solicitation); see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071-1136 (1990) (discussing collective 
action problems in incurring proxy expenses).  
40 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
887-951, 920 (2002) (“If the bidder makes a firm offer, however, the bidder will expose itself 
to risk – essentially the bidder will be providing the target shareholders with a year-long put 
option for their shares.”). 
41 Id. at 938 (reporting that, in their sample of hostile bids, between 25% to 32% of the 
targets were eventually acquired by a white knight). 
42 Coates measures the potency of a takeover defense by the number of days in which 
the defense can delay a purchase of the company’s stock.  This delay is computed for every 
firm and thereby creates an innovative index, the “contestability index,” for every measured 
company.  The contestability index allows for a fine-tuned comparative analysis of different 
types of legal defenses.  See John C. Coates, An Index of the Contestability of Corporate 
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can postpone the replacement of the board of directors, then it will take 
longer to remove the poison pill, which will achieve the desired delay and the 
corresponding cost to the bidder as well as possibly rendering the takeover 
non-viable. This endeavor, however, requires the availability of special 
measures in the form of antitakeover charter amendments. In the absence of 
such measures, a poison pill by itself does not create much delay to the 
conclusion of a takeover.43 The reason for this is that the default arrangement 
under Delaware law allows the majority of the shareholders to replace the 
entire board of directors without any cause,44 in a rapid process of written 
consent.45 This process is slightly hindered by the federal securities 
regulation that requires filing and clearance of proxy statements.46 However, 
this procedure also does not produce much of a delay, especially since, even 
in the absence of a poison pill, the Williams Act imposes a minimum period 
of twenty business days to tender shares.47 
Recall, however, that this is the state of affairs under the default legal 
standard.  Well-crafted antitakeover charter provisions can radically alter the 
picture. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that such antitakeover provisions 
became prevalent in the wake of the proliferation of the poison pill.  Simply 
put, in the absence of such provisions, the poison pill is rather impotent, 
although it should be noted that these defensive provisions require 
shareholder consent for implementation.48 Among the charter provisions that 
delay the replacement of an existing board (and, therefore, the removal of a 
poison pill),49 the most prominent is the staggered board provision.50 The 
 
Control Studying Variations in Legal Takeover Vulnerability (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
43 The fact that a poison pill, in itself, does not create much delay could explain 
empirical findings that a poison pill does not have much of an impact.  For the results of an 
empirical study, see Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence 
on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3
(1995) (finding that a poison pill does not much hinder the likelihood of being taken over). 
44 See  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141 (1999) (replacement of directors). 
45 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 228 (1999) (written consent in lieu of a vote in 
shareholders meeting).  
46 For the delays imposed by the SEC involvement, see Coates, supra note 33, at 853 
(stating that it takes about 45-60 days for the Securities and Exchange Commission to pre-
clear the proxy statement, which includes the time required for the solicitation itself). 
47 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1999) (William Act requirement of a 
minimum of twenty business days for the tendering period). 
48 See Coates, supra note 21, at 323-25 (discussing midstream defenses adoption that 
requires shareholder approval). 
49 Other charter provisions include: provisions that revoke shareholders’ right to voice 
their opinion by written consent (in lieu of voting in person or via proxy in a shareholders 
meeting); provisions that forbid special shareholder meetings (or make them harder to 
assemble); provisions that require a supermajority vote to remove directors from office; 
provisions that divest shareholders’ powers to fill vacancies on the board; a blank-check-
preferred stock provision that entitles the board to issue preferred stock without shareholders’ 
approval; and provisions that require supermajority shareholder approval for bylaw 
amendments that are not recommended by the board of directors. See Sharon Hannes, 
Corporate Stagnation: Discussion and Reform Proposal, 30 J. CORP. L. 51, 64-68 (2004) 
(discussing various antitakeover provisions). 
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default standard in all states requires that all directors stand for election 
annually.51 Nevertheless, all states also allow deviating from this standard by 
adding a staggered board provision to the incorporation documents.52 With a 
staggered board, directors are divided into three classes, with each class up 
for election in different successive years.53 The significance of this structure 
in the takeover context is that a bidder must win at least two proxy battles in 
order to capture the majority of the board and then redeem the poison pill.54 
Thus, a staggered board imposes at least a year’s delay in gaining control 
over the board.55 
It is not surprising, therefore, that one study found that staggered boards 
increase by as much as 26% a target’s likelihood of remaining independent in 
a hostile bid.56 This significant increase in likelihood of remaining 
independent was undoubtedly quite appealing to many managers.  In the 
second half of the 1980s, just before the poison pill had gained its current 
full-pledged court support, managers in many firms succeeded in securing 
shareholder approval to stagger the boards.  Danielson and Karpoff found that 
the number of antitakeover provisions, including staggered board provisions, 
 
50 In the absence of a poison pill, a staggered board is a mild takeover defense, since 
the bidder may purchase the entire stock.  Following such an acquisition, the removal of 
directors is imminent, even if it takes some time.  Once a poison pill is in place, the board can 
take all the time it has until its removal to try and evade the bid.  See ROBERT C. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 576 (1986) (classifying the staggered board provision in the pre-poison pill 
era as a mild takeover defense). 
51 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, s. 211(b) (2000); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT s. 
8.03(d) (1999). 
52 See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 40, at 893.  
53 This description fits the usual three-tiered classified boards.  It is unusual for state 
law to allow for more classes.  But cf. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW s. 704(a) (McKinney 2001) 
(allowing four classes for firms incorporated in New York). 
54 Staggered boards may delay takeover for even longer periods of time if managers 
have considerable influence over a small percentage of the firm’s votes and the firm has 
cumulative voting. See Coates, supra note 5, at 1389-93 (explaining factors that foster delay).  
55 In addition to the delaying measures, prevention of hostile takeovers altogether may 
be achieved if the founders maintain a controlling stake subsequent to the IPO, including by 
separating ownership from control.  Separation of ownership and control can be achieved by 
way of three alternative mechanisms: stock pyramids, cross-holdings, and dual class stock.  
Using one of these mechanisms, the controller can achieve a complete lock on control with 
any level of ownership.  See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and 
Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow 
Rights, in Concentrated Corporate Ownership 295-318 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2002) 
(discussing alternative methods for separating ownership from control). 
56 See Bebchuk, Coates & Subraminian, supra note 40, at 937 (“Figure 3 shows that 
the likelihood of remaining independent is 26% higher for ESB targets; Table 3 shows that 
the short-run cost of remaining independent is 36%.”). See also Brent W. Ambrose & 
William L. Megginson, The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover 
Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, 27 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 575 
(1992) (finding that staggered boards are associated with a decrease in the likelihood of a 
firm being acquired, whereas other takeover defenses have no statistically significant effect 
on acquisition likelihood). 
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in seasoned firms grew tenfold during this period.57 In a recent sampling of 
2421 large public U.S. firms, 59% were found to have staggered boards.58 
Interestingly, 84% of the companies we see today with staggered boards 
adopted the provision prior to 1990.59 
Since the late 1980s, however, institutional investors have changed their 
voting practices and become unwilling to vote for antitakeover charter 
provisions.60 This occurred either due to the revelation of the poison pill’s 
power or to the growth in institutional investors’ activism and organization.  
In turn, management proposals to stagger boards dropped from ninety 
proposals in 1988 to just nine proposals in 1998.61 The window of 
opportunity to adopt antitakeover provisions in seasoned firms was practically 
shut.  Interestingly, the very same institutional investors who block 
management proposals to adopt staggered boards do not require that IPO-
stage firms reject staggered boards.  Hence, in the 1990s, the takeover 
defenses adopted by public U.S. companies were generally fixed, whereas 
IPO-stage companies continued to enjoy the flexibility to choose different 
types and amounts of defenses.62 
B. Traditional Arguments vis-à-vis New Empirical Findings 
 
The proliferation of takeover defenses in the 1980s sparked an 
unprecedented debate over whether these defenses are beneficial or 
detrimental. This debate is related to the intense discussions in the economic 
and legal scholarship on hostile takeovers.63 Simply put, those who regard 
takeovers as beneficial oppose takeover defenses, and those who are skeptical 
about the benefits of the takeover phenomenon value defenses. Traditional 
arguments about takeover defenses maintain either that defenses (or at least 
some level of defenses) are beneficial for all firms or that they are detrimental 
for all firms, with most scholars closer to the latter view.  Perhaps the most 
 
57 See Morris G. Danielson & Jonathan M. Karpoff, On the Uses of Corporate 
Governance Provisions, 4 J. CORP. FIN. 347, 354, tbl. 2 (1998) (collecting data on takeover 
provisions).  See also Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Managers’ Voting Rights 
and Corporate Control, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 267 (1989) (same). 
58 See Coates, supra note 5, at 1353, 1376. 
59 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law 
Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 517 (2001). 
60 See Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 84 (“ATPs are … opposed by institutional 
investors.  Institutional investors have sponsored shareholders’ proposals seeking the 
elimination of ATPs and adopted shareholder voting protocols under which they will 
automatically vote against the adoption of a charter amendment containing an ATP.”). 
61 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 59, at 517. 
62 Coates, supra note 5, at 1308 (stating the fixation of takeover defenses following the 
IPO). 
63 For a summary at length, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, 
Evidence and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992).  
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prominent parties in the early period of this debate are Martin Lipton,64 in 
favor of takeover defenses, and Easterbrook and Fischel, opposing defenses. 
In a nutshell, Lipton argues that hostile bids are often coercive, harm 
shareholder interests, and are disruptive and costly for the targets.  Moreover, 
he posits that hostile bidders often exploit market mispricing of the target 
stock and that the threat of hostile takeovers reduces investment in long-run 
projects by management.65 Hence, according to Lipton, takeover defenses are 
beneficial as they allow management to control the sale of the company,66 in 
that it can use its discretion to thwart unfavorable deals or negotiate better 
terms for the shareholders.67 Easterbrook and Fischel’s view runs in the 
opposite direction.  They assert that takeovers improve social welfare by 
producing premiums for target shareholders and relocating assets to those 
who value them most.68 In addition, they argue that the threat of hostile 
takeovers reduces agency costs between managers and distant shareholders.69 
Armed with takeover defenses, managers are shielded from the beneficial 
takeover threat,70 or at least may secure some personal gains when they do 
concede to a takeover.71 Therefore, Easterbrook and Fischel strongly argue 
that the law should prohibit all antitakeover defenses and maneuvers. 
Three recent empirical studies tracing firm behavior at the IPO stage 
have cast much doubt on both the traditional views.  The empirical data show 
 
64 Not only does Lipton support takeover defenses employed by target firms, he also 
requires the legislator to provide protection against hostile bids. See Martin Lipton & Steven 
Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of 
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205-14 (1991) (requiring protection by legislators). 
65 Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 120-
24 (1979).  Among his arguments, Lipton also mentions socially undesirable layoffs, but in 
this paper, I concentrate on the shareholders’ perspective.  
66 While these views were highly unpopular in academia for many years, they recently 
regained support.  See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics are 
Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right (Working Paper 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=803836 (backing the traditional view presented 
by Lipton); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,
119 Harv. L. Rev. (Forthcoming 2006) (opposing the most recent views that negate Lipton’s 
traditional arguments). 
67 The negotiation power is a repeated theme in the literature. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1693 (1985); Bebchuk, supra note 11, 917-31 (1987); Elazar Berkovitz & Naveen Khanna, 
How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers,
45 J. FIN. 137, 137 (1990); Gilson, supra note 1, at 51 (1982); Rene Stulz, Managerial 
Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1990); Harry DeAngelo & 
Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Shareholder Wealth, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 329 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights 
Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 841-53 (1998). 
68 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168-74 (1981). 
69 Id. at 1168-74. 
70 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. REV.
713, 719 (2003) (discussing managers’ perverse incentives). 
71 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Value, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 899 (2005) (claiming that even when the board agrees to the sale, it might seek 
some private payoff at shareholders’ expense). 
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that firms diverge in taste for takeover defenses at the IPO stage, suggesting 
that defenses are neither entirely harmful nor entirely beneficial to all firms. 
Moreover, these empirical works could not even back more nuanced views, 
which claim that defenses suit certain firms and into which this paper delves 
further on.72 At this juncture, however, it is of primary importance to give 
close scrutiny to the new empirical findings, which have puzzled corporate 
scholars and on which this paper intends to shed light. I discuss the empirical 
studies in order of publication. 
The first published paper was the empirical work of Daines and 
Klausner, who sampled more than three-hundred IPO-stage firms that went 
public during the period of 1994 to 1997.73 In their sample, they intentionally 
included many IPO corporations backed by either venture capital or LBO 
experts. Daines and Klausner reasonably assumed that these corporations with 
professional pre-IPO investors could not be abused by their managers at the 
IPO stage, nor would they adopt unwarranted antitakeover practices by mistake. 
Venture capitalists and LBO experts are sophisticated investors with great 
influence over the firms they invest in, which presumably leads to an optimal 
governance structure at the IPO stage.74 
The highlight of Daines and Klausner’s findings is that IPO firms vary 
greatly with respect to their antitakeover practices. Almost half of the firms 
sampled had adopted harsh takeover defenses (mostly staggered boards), and 
18% had adopted milder takeover defenses in their charters.75 The remaining 
firms had refrained from adopting defenses altogether.  Most importantly, 
however, similar findings emerged in the sub-samples of firms with highly 
sophisticated outside investors, such as venture capital funds or LBO experts.  
Daines and Klausner then examined whether dissimilarities among the 
sampled firms had led to the divergent behavior. They tried to test three major 
theories, which this paper discusses at length below,76 but the empirical 
evidence could support none.77 The authors concluded that it is practically 
 
72 Infra Section III.2. 
73 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 92. 
74 Robert Gertner & Steven N. Kaplan, THE VALUE MAXIMIZING BOARDS (SSRN 
Working Paper Series No. 10563, 1998), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=10563 (exploring the effects of efficient 
board structures on firm performance).  
75 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 95-96, 110. 
76 Infra Section III.2. 
77 Specifically, they claimed that the myopia theory and the bargaining power theory 
were refuted by the evidence, whereas the private benefits hypothesis was neither refuted nor 
supported.  We cannot be certain that the bargaining power and myopia hypotheses were, 
indeed, refuted by the Daines and Klausner findings.  First, the authors assumed that the more 
M&A activity in the industry, the less defenses needed, because competition will drive the 
prices up regardless of defenses.  However, one could make the opposite argument, that when 
potential competition is present, defenses are most valuable for driving up the price, because 
delaying the takeover will definitely allow competition to emerge.  Second, the examination 
of the myopia hypothesis is also imperfect.  The authors assume that high R&D levels in the 
industry will lead to adoption of defenses because of the fear of an opportunistic bid.  
However, it has been also argued in the literature that R&D levels may be excessive when 
asymmetric information exists.  See Bebchuk & Stole, supra note 106.  Thus, it is possible 
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impossible to attribute the variance in antitakeover protection to the 
dissimilarities among the issuing firms. 
The second paper was published by Coates, who examined two samples 
of IPO firms: the main group of data includes over three-hundred IPOs that 
took place between 1991 and 1992, accompanied by a smaller control sample 
of IPO firms from 1998. His basic findings follow those of Daines and 
Klausner:  a high degree of variance in the antitakeover practices of firms that 
go public. Although the adoption of takeover defenses has gained in popularity 
over time, the 1998 sample indicates that many firms still opt not to adopt them. 
Coates, like Daines and Klausner, brings empirical refutation of alternative 
theories that might explain why defenses are better suited to some firms than to 
others. 
Finally, Field and Karpoff also conducted comprehensive research of 
takeover defenses at the IPO stage, investigating over a thousand firms that 
went public between 1988 and 1992.78 This is the earliest sample of IPO-stage 
firms to have been collected. Fifty-three percent of the firms sampled had at 
least one takeover defense, while the rest refrained from adopting defenses 
altogether.79 
Altogether, the empirical picture that was revealed in these recent high-
profile papers clearly indicates a need to reconsider the voluminous takeover 
theory literature.  Not only was it a blow to traditional theories that argue either 
that defenses fit all firms or fit none, but it also undercut more moderate 
theories, which argue that variances among issuers explain divergent 
antitakeover practices.  These heterogeneity theories, which are discussed 
below, were not supported by the empirical findings, although they were tested 
for.  This development in the literature has had two ramifications: One, 
additional heterogeneity theories have been crafted. Two, the authors of the 
empirical papers raised some market failure explanations for firms’ diverging 
practices.  In Section III below, I argue that a comprehensive view of the 
market for takeover defenses could shed light on the recent empirical findings.  
Under this view of the market, all existing heterogeneity explanations are 
regarded as supply factors, and together with a novel demand-side factor, they 
lead to a richer view of firm behavior.  In Section V, I compare this market 
view with the market failure explanations proposed by the authors of the three 
empirical papers noted above. 
 
III. Reconsidering Takeover Defenses 
 
A. Reframing Traditional Arguments in Market Terms 
 
that the exposure of targets with excessive R&D to the market of corporate control can cure 
part of the waste, assuming that specialized bidders can identify excessive R&D levels.  To 
sum up, while I do not fully accept Daines and Klausner’s interpretation, they did expose the 
fact that it is hard to key dissimilar antitakeover practices to dissimilarities among firms. 
78 Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1859. 
79 Id. at 1884. 
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The empirical findings indicating that IPO-stage firms sharply diverge in 
takeover practices challenged the traditional views that defenses are either 
beneficial to all firms or inimical to all firms80 and paved the way for the 
evolution of more nuanced theories of defenses.  Before describing the latter 
theories, it is important to first reformulate the traditional accounts in market 
terms.  This new take on the traditional views exposes them as relating to a 
highly degenerated and unrealistic takeover defenses market. 
Recall the features of the market for takeover defenses as described in the 
Introduction. There are two types of products in this market: the first, a firm 
lacking takeover defenses, or an unshielded target, and the second, a firm with 
takeover defenses, or a shielded target.  In reality, a garden-variety of shields 
exists, each with different antitakeover potencies,81 but for our purposes we 
need only concentrate on the two extreme forms. In addition, there are multiple 
producers in the market, each capable of producing a separate, single product 
for each firm they control.  The production act is in the combining of adoption 
(or rejection) of takeover shields and floating the target on the market.  
Production currently takes place at the time the firm goes public since “[o]nly 
at the IPO stage does a company continue to have the ability to choose different 
types and amounts of defenses that will regulate hostile bids for the life of the 
company.”82 
The aggregate supply of unshielded (and shielded) targets is the result of 
the joint decision of multiple producers.  The cost of producing a shielded 
target determines the supply curve.  In addition to the negligible cost of legal 
counsel for installing defenses, these costs involve, primarily, all the 
shortcomings of having defenses, such as managerial consumption of increased 
control benefits.  Similarly, the cost of producing an unshielded target includes 
all the shortcomings of being unshielded, such as the lack of negotiating power. 
Moreover, since producing an unshielded target necessarily requires rejecting 
the shielded alternative, the costs of rejection include the foregoing of all the 
benefits of being shielded.83 Finally, the market for takeover defenses includes 
potential acquirers of both shielded and unshielded products.  Since takeover 
defenses make targets more elusive, we should expect a divergence in demand 
for shielded and unshielded targets.   
Equipped with this understanding of demand-and-supply for shielded and 
unshielded products, it is now possible to give a new account of the traditional 
views about takeover defenses in a market setting.  Two markets can be 
described: the market for unshielded products (i.e., firms lacking defenses) and 
the market for shielded products (i.e., firms with defenses).  However, these 
 
80 For the classic approach of opponents of defenses, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 68; Alan Shwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
229-53 (1986).  For the classic view of proponents of defenses, see Lipton, supra note 65. 
81 See Coates, supra note 5, at 1387 (listing various governance terms that affect 
takeover vulnerability). 
82 Coates, supra note 5, at 1308. See also Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt 
Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 Penn. L. Rev. 713, 723 (2003). 
83 The foregone benefits of adopting takeover shields could, therefore, be termed the 
alternative costs of producing an unshielded target. 
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markets are intertwined, as the two products constitute the flipsides of the same 
coin.  It therefore suffices to examine only the market for one of the products, 
as the equilibrium in the one market will reveal the outcome in the alternative 
market.  In other words, if we determine the number of firms that would go 
public with defenses, we can easily ascertain the complementary number of 
firms that would reject defenses, and vice versa.  Hence, throughout this paper, 
to simplify matters, I concentrate on the market for unshielded products. 
Again, the classic takeover defense theories include arguments that 
describe the defenses either as beneficial or as harmful for all firms.  These 
classic theories were recently rephrased in terms of the organ of the company 
that should be granted the decision-making power regarding the fate of a 
takeover bid: 
“The classic debate on how a publicly traded company should 
decide whether to accept an acquisition offer has been 
dominated by two schools of thought.  According to one 
group of scholars, it is the elected representatives of 
shareholders entrusted with the management of the company 
– the board of directors – whose approval should always be 
necessary to sell a company … . According to a second group 
of scholars, it is the shareholders as owners of the company 
who should, at any time, be able to see the company, whether 
or not the board approves the sale.”84 
Most scholars undoubtedly subscribe to the latter school of thought, 
advocating absolute choice for shareholders and, therefore, relating to defenses 
as harmful.85 Accordingly, the market for takeover defenses implied by this 
latter traditional view is depicted in Figure 1 below, in which the X-axis 
represents the number of unshielded “products” on the market. 
 
Figure 1: Traditional Theories in Market Terms
Unshielded Firms
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84 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 480-81. 
85 See Coates, supra note 5, at 1377 (“Exceptions exist, but academics have generally 
opposed defenses, and practitioners have generally supported them.”). 
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The stringent nature of the traditional view (and, in this case, the anti-
defenses view) is evident from Figure 1.  Neither supply nor demand for 
unshielded products fluctuates with the number of products produced, reflecting 
the view that the costs and benefits of defenses are fixed.  Note that the demand 
tops supply at all points, manifesting the view that the benefit of going public 
without defenses always outweighs any possible cost of creating defenses.  
Given this, all producers—i.e., any firm considering going public—should opt 
to produce only unshielded firms.  Any other decision would mean that the 
producer fails to produce a product for which the market is willing to pay much 
more than its cost of production. 
The proponents of this anti-defenses traditional view advocate it not only 
as a normative argument but also as a positive description of reality.  Adoption 
of takeover defenses, goes the argument, would never occur in IPOs and can 
only occur in mature firms where managers are able to adopt defenses contrary 
to the welfare of the firm’s shareholders. In the very words of such proponents, 
“Firms go public in easy-to-acquire form: no poison pill securities, no 
supermajority rules or staggered boards.  Defensive provisions are added later, 
a sequence that reveals much.”86 While this description might have been 
accurate at the time it was written, reflecting market features of the 1980s, it 
certainly cannot stand today.  By the end of the 1990, as discussed above, 
mature firms could not alter their antitakeover exposure, whereas IPO firms 
were free to adopt defenses.87 That many IPO-stage firms realized this freedom 
by adopting defenses means that the market structure implied by this traditional 
view and reflected in Figure 1 cannot stand. 
Let us recall the opposite traditional view, regarding takeover defenses as 
beneficial to all firms since defenses equip management with the discretion to 
decide the fate of takeover bids.  The main advocate of this view is Martin 
Lipton, who wrote, 
“Many corporations annually or periodically face decisions 
with respect to capital expenditures, new product 
introductions, adoption of new processes, termination or 
disposition of business or bankruptcy, that may have as 
significant an impact on the market value of the corporation as 
a takeover bid.  As long as matters such as capital 
expenditures, discontinuances of businesses and bankruptcy 
are for the reasonable business judgment of the directors, there 
is no reason to put acceptance or rejection of a takeover bid on 
a different basis.”88 
However, the market structure implied by this pro-defenses traditional 
view is as stringent as under the other traditional view, and it also fails to pass 
the reality test.  Following the lines of the market structure reflected in Figure 
1, Lipton’s view is that the costs and benefits of defenses are, for all intents and 
 
86 See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law 4-7 (1991). 
87 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 723; Coates, supra note 5, at 1308. 
88 Lipton, supra note 65, at 121. 
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purposes, fixed for all firms.  In market terms, the difference between Lipton 
and the traditional opponents of defenses is that, in contrast to the market 
portrayed in Figure 1, Lipton assumes that supply for unshielded targets always 
tops demand.  This means that the cost of going public without shields (i.e., the 
foregone benefits of being shielded) always outweighs the willingness of the 
market to pay for an unshielded target, and therefore no producer should decide 
to produce such a worthless product.  Moreover, when the cost exceeds the 
market price, it is illogical to produce such a product.  Consequently, the 
empirical studies that found divergences in firm antitakeover practices negate 
the market structure implied by this second traditional theory as well. 
In light of these findings, researchers have had to update their views on the 
structure of the market for corporate takeover defenses.  Old theories that could 
account for the diversified practices of defenses were revitalized, and new 
theories were crafted.  All these theories entailed a modified view of this 
market, implicitly claiming that producers vary in production costs of shielded 
and unshielded products.  These theories should be regarded as supply-side 
explanations from a market perspective and are discussed in Sub-Section B 
below. 
 
B. Multiple Supply-Side Explanations 
 
Supply-side theories offer different explanations for why it is better for 
some firms (or some controllers) to adopt defenses, while others would fare 
better in the absence of defenses.  These explanations draw a more contoured 
picture of reality as they flesh out the understanding that firms differ in relevant 
characteristics. This variation in characteristics bears an accompanying 
divergence in firms’ costs of going public without defenses (i.e., of producing 
an unshielded target).  I present below four such supply-side theories, all of 
which highlight firms’ heterogeneity, and I reformulate them in market terms.  
Each of these explanations constitutes a unique version of supply-side 
considerations. These theories, however, do not exhaust all supply-side 
explanations.  Any theory that explains why it is better for some firms to adopt 
or reject defenses due to their nature or business characteristics may be 
similarly viewed.89 Following the presentation of the supply-side explanations, 
I will complete the depiction of the market for takeover defenses by presenting 
a novel demand-side consideration.  In contrast to the supply-side arguments, 
 
89 This may be the case of “team production” explanations for takeover defenses.  See,
e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholders as Ulysses: Empirical Evidence Why Investors in 
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 667, 680-81 (2003) 
(arguing that takeover defenses may promote team production within the firm); Lynn Stout, 
Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Ante/Ex Post Valuation 
Problem, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 845 (2002) (arguing that defenses encourage nonshareholder 
groups to make extracontractual investments in corporate team production); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 
305 (1999); but cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate 
Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 1011-13 (2002) (claiming that there is no empirical 
support for the team-production theory). 
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which focus on the issuer side, the demand-side explanation concentrates on 
bidders’ willingness to pay for an unshielded target and argues that it is linked 
to the proportion of the firms on the market that remain unshielded.   
 Finally, note that although supply-side and demand-side considerations 
should complement one another to formulate a more comprehensive 
understanding of IPO-stage defense adoption trends, they in fact serve also as 
independent explanations and do not necessarily rest on one another.  In the 
case of supply-side explanations, this means that issuer concerns alone could 
determine which firms will adopt defenses; with demand-side explanations, it 
means that bidder preferences alone can explain why firms differ in their 
defense practices even when they share relevant characteristics.  
 
1. Bargaining Power and Manager Control over Method of Sale 
What is perhaps the most famous supply-side theory builds on the 
argument that takeover defenses may assist shareholders in bargaining for the 
sale of the company and that this benefit varies from firm to firm.  A recent 
sophisticated version of the argument, which emphasizes manager discretion in 
crafting an optimal sale strategy, reads as follows: 
“[S]hareholders reasonably might opt for board entrenchment – 
implemented, for example, by means of a staggered board – in order to 
enable a board to employ selling strategies more effectively and, thus, 
to increase the premium shareholders receive when the company is 
sold. Such discretion is a kind of precommitment whereby shareholders, 
by binding themselves ex ante, may be able to improve their collective 
position ex post.”90 
This theory thus concentrates on the ex post influence of takeover defenses, 
i.e., the payoff to shareholders once a takeover has taken place.  Shareholders’ 
gain from a takeover event is the price per share they receive above the market 
price of the share prior to the takeover, often defined as the takeover 
premium.91 Since the board has flexible capabilities and superior information 
about the firm, it can time the sale of the firm, dictate the manner of sale,92 and 
negotiate with potential buyers much better than the scattered body of 
shareholders.93 To be sure, there are also costs to manager discretion.  The 
 
90 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 473. 
91 See Michael Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2. J. ECON. PERSP.
21 (1988) (reporting vast premiums to target shareholders in takeover events).. 
92 Even if the managers decide on an auction, they can improve the results for the 
shareholders by deciding on a minimum price that is higher than the market price.  The 
shareholders themselves can hardly commit to such a higher threshold price.  See John G. 
Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 381, 382 (1981) 
(providing a formal analysis of auction rules that shows the benefits of announcing a 
minimum acceptance price that is higher than the reservation price).  
93 In addition, antitakeover mechanisms may enable managers to block coercively 
designed bids.  The coercion results from a front-loaded bid, i.e., a bid that offers the 
tendering shareholders more than the value of untendered stock.  If shareholders believe that 
enough shareholders will tender and that the bid will therefore succeed, they will rationally 
elect to tender their stock as well, even if it would have been better for all shareholders to 
cooperate rather than tender their stock.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 917-31; 
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board may abuse defenses to its advantage by entrenching the managers in their 
current positions, while disregarding the interests of shareholders.94 It is 
therefore far from surprising that, as has been empirically proven, the takeover 
frequency of shielded targets is lower than that of their unshielded 
counterparts.95 Hence, there is a tradeoff between the benefits of managerial 
discretion and its costs, with this tradeoff varying from firm to firm, based on 
firm characteristics. 
The new articulation of this theory, cited above, follows older theories 
that emphasized the bargaining advantage of the board of directors.96 
However, there are two major differences. First, the new account emphasizes 
the board’s advantage in deciding on the proper method of sale for the 
company,97 instead of the older emphasis on the board’s superior information 
about the firm. Second, and more importantly for my purposes, the authors 
make it clear that, under their theory, only part of the firm will adopt defenses. 
“[T]he optimal allocation of decision-making power depends on 
several empirical factors that may vary from company to company.
These factors include the balance between the significance of the 
board’s informational advantages and the importance of selling 
 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate 
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1985). 
94 Two types of costs are involved: loss of some takeover opportunities and an 
increased consumption of private benefits by the managers who are partially protected from 
removal. 
95 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., supra note 40 (covering only firms that were actually 
engaged in hostile takeover battles); Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1877 (measuring the 
frequency of all acquisitions and, therefore, not focusing only on actual cases of hostile 
takeover events). 
96 The crux of all these arguments is that managers have better means and incentives to 
negotiate an improved deal than does the body of scattered shareholders.  Granting takeover 
defenses to managers empowers them to conduct such negotiations.  See, e.g., Bebchuk, 
supra note 1; Elazar Berkovitch & Naveen Khanna, How Target Shareholders Benefit from 
Value-Reducing Defenses Strategies in Takeovers, 45 J. FIN. 137 (1990); Dale A. Oesterle, 
The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court, 72 
Cornell L. Rev. 117, 124-31 (1986) (emphasizing managers’ superior ability to assess the 
value of the company); Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter 
Amendments and Shareholders Wealth, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 329-60 (1983) (modeling how 
manager discretion can lead to higher premiums in a takeover event); David S. Scharfstein, 
The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers, 55 REV. ECON. STUD. 185-200 (1988); Rene M. Stulz, 
Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 28-34 (1988) (modeling manager ability to overcome dispersed 
shareholders’ collective action problems); Stulz, supra note 67 (same).  On the empirical 
side, Comment & Schwert, supra note 17, found that the presence of a poison pill increases 
the takeover premium.  However, since most firms without poison pills can easily and rapidly 
adopt one, the significance of this finding is dubious. 
97 The method of sale should be read in a broad sense. Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, 
at 477 (“A selling strategy can, among other things, entail choosing the time to sell, soliciting 
offers from other bidders or threatening to do so, haggling over price, disclosing information 
to bides, rejecting an offer, making ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ counter-offers, or misrepresenting 
one’s willingness to sell.”). 
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strategies, on the one hand, with the various benefits from 
constraining agency costs on the other.”98 
And although the bargaining power argument seems, at first glance, to be a pro-
defense argument, the authors clearly state that it also explains why some firms 
should reject defenses.  From this point of view, they interpret some recent 
empirical evidence as follows: 
“In 1990, Massachusetts legislatively imposed staggered boards on all 
Massachusetts public companies, even if the charters of these 
companies provided for annual elections of the whole board.  Studies 
of this Massachusetts legislation have shown that the stock price of 
Massachusetts companies that did not already have staggered boards 
declined.  The result of these studies is consistent with our argument 
that shareholder choice represents a plausible governance structure 
and that staggered boards are not universally desirable.  Forcing 
staggered boards onto companies that did not opt to include staggered 
board provisions in their charter should thus be expected to reduce 
company value.”99 
It is now possible to formulate this theory as a supply-side explanation for 
the divergence in antitakeover practices among IPO firms, with the assistance 
of Figure 2, below, which follows the same lines as the earlier framework. 
 
Figure 2: Supply-Side Theories
Unshielded Firms
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In Figure 2, the X-axis is the number of firms that do not adopt defenses 
and the Y-axis is the costs arising from the decision of a given firm to remain 
unshielded.  Recall that we are considering the market for unshielded targets 
and that producing an unshielded target requires foregoing any benefits of the 
shielded alternative.  The curve is a supply curve for producing unshielded 
targets, as it represents the marginal costs of going public without defenses for 
any number of unshielded firms in the market.  The supply curve is upward 
sloping since firms diverge in their taste for defenses.  Some firms, the ones for 
 
98 Id., at 488.  
99 Id., at 506.  
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which manager decision power is most important, have high costs for going 
public unshielded, since defenses serve as a commitment to empower 
managers.  Other firms, with a lower need for managerial discretion (or perhaps 
higher costs for granting such discretion), do not incur such high costs for going 
public unshielded.  From left to right, the first firms are those that have the least 
need for managerial bargaining power and, thereafter, in ascending order, lie 
the firms that can benefit more from a commitment for managerial discretion. 
Now, in order to identify the cutoff between firms that adopt defenses and 
those that reject them, we must also consider the price that the market is willing 
to pay for a firm that goes public unshielded.  For now let us assume that the 
benefit of going public without shields is represented by the dotted horizontal 
curve, which may, therefore, be termed the demand curve.  Consequently, all 
firms to the right of the intersection of the two curves will go public with 
takeover defenses.  For these firms, the costs of producing an unshielded target, 
represented by the supply curve, are higher than the benefits derived from being 
unshielded.  Conversely, all firms to the left of the intersection will opt to 
produce unshielded products, since their costs of producing an unshielded 
target are lower than the benefits derived from that product. 
Note, however, that, in this framework, demand is still stagnant and does 
not fluctuate with the number of unshielded firms in the market, leading to the 
issue of empirical verification of the argument discussed above.  Researchers 
have speculated that the firms most likely to need takeover defenses for 
negotiation purposes are those that operate in market sectors with low merger 
and acquisition (M&A) activity.  Where M&A activity is high, goes the 
argument, competition among bidders will drive the takeover premium up, even 
in the absence of takeover defenses.  In contrast, where few potential bidders 
exist, the chances for competition are slim, and it is important to adopt defenses 
to extract a high offer from an available bidder.100 This hypothesis, however, 
was rejected by the data,101 leaving the bargaining power supply-side theory 
with no direct empirical verification. 
 
2. Protecting Managerial Ex-Ante Incentives 
A second supply-side theory is an ex-ante perspective on manager 
incentives.  Under this theory, in some firms, exposure to the threat of a hostile 
takeover significantly distorts manager incentives at the outset to running the 
 
100 This interpretation of the bargaining power theory is tenuous. It assumes that the 
more M&A activity present in the industry, the less defenses are needed, because competition 
will drive the prices up notwithstanding defenses.  However, one could make the opposite 
argument, that when potential competition is present, defenses are most valuable for driving 
up the price because delaying a takeover will definitely allow competition to emerge. Put 
differently, defenses may provide leverage even in an environment with high levels of M&A 
activity.  For additional criticism, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 10, at 503. 
101 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 102 (“The coefficient on the bidder competition 
variable is significant, but the sign is positive rather than negative, meaning that the more 
competitive the market for corporate control in a firm’s industry, the stronger the 
antitakeover protection a firm is likely to have.  This is opposite of what the bargaining 
power hypothesis predicts.”). 
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firm business. This view seems to contradict the traditional ex-ante approach 
that rests on the notion that hostile takeovers are generally beneficial to 
shareholders since they discipline managers. According to this notion, 
managers are threatened by the possibility of a takeover and therefore do not 
shirk their duties,102 for otherwise, the market value of their firm would decline, 
which would set-up the opportunity for a raider to buy the company at a low 
cost and reap the benefits of improving the firm after the acquisition.  
According to this approach, any takeover defense that may impede a takeover 
attempt is harmful.  And the more shielded a firm, the greater the risk of 
misconduct on the part of the firm’s management.103 
A more nuanced view, however, considers managerial exposure to 
takeovers, at least in certain market sectors, detrimental to the shareholders.  In 
market sectors in which managerial decisions are highly complex or involve 
much unverifiable inside information, the market may underestimate 
management efforts; in such a myopic market, unleashed market discipline may 
be counter-productive.104 Managers who have not committed any wrongdoing 
may be replaced in a hostile takeover maneuver simply because of the market’s 
undervaluation of the firm, which created the opportunity for a shrewd raider to 
take over the enterprise.105 For their part, managers may forsake long-term or 
hard-to-evaluate projects that are beneficial to the shareholders, in favor of 
projects that are inferior but easier to assess. For instance, with an eye to the 
threat of takeover, managers may under-invest or over-invest to satisfy 
investors seeking short-term returns.106 Takeover defenses could prevent such 
scenarios and the distortion of managerial incentives by partially neutralizing 
the threat of takeover.107 When managers are relatively takeover-proof, goes the 
 
102 In their seminal work, Jensen and Meckling define the three components of agency 
costs: monitoring (costs of principal scrutiny); bonding (costs of agent commitments); and 
residual loss (the remaining loss from agent misbehavior).  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8. 
103 Many more restraining market forces and internal mechanisms help reduce 
managerial agency costs.  However, they also leave the door wide open for a takeover threat. 
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 847 (1993). 
104 Stein was the first to link the takeover market behavior with the inefficient market 
hypotheses.  See Jeremy Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON.
61 (1988) (explaining how myopic markets require managerial protection); Jeremy Stein, 
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 
Q.J. ECON. 393 (1989) (same).  Many additional papers followed, see, e.g., Thomas J. 
Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual-Class IPOs, Share Recapitalizations, and Unifications: A 
Theoretical Analysis (Working Paper 2005), available at 
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=778244 (a model of antitakeover provisions and 
market inability to observe the value of long-term projects). 
105 Similar to Stein’s principal point, Shleifer and Vishny argue that the value of firms 
that invest in long-term hard-to-evaluate projects is likely to be discounted relative to their 
peers that invest in short-term projects.  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium 
Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148-53 (1990). 
106 The observation that market inefficiencies can cause both under- and over-
investment belongs to Lucian Bebchuk & L. Stole, Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to 
Underinvestment or Overinvestment in Long Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719 (1993). 
107 While it is difficult to find direct evidence for myopic mispricing, it was recently 
shown that high levels of transient ownership are associated with an overweighing of near-
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argument, they can freely pursue the best possible business strategies without 
fear of being misevaluated by the market. 
This nuanced approach to the effect of takeover defenses on managerial 
behavior, which holds that firms diverge in how takeover exposure affects 
manager incentives, can also be framed as a supply-side theory of takeover 
defenses.  Some firms have low costs of producing an unshielded target, as 
takeover exposure does not distort their managers’ incentives, while other firms 
have high costs, since foregoing takeover defenses would lead their managers 
to pursue undesirable business strategies.  The graph in Figure 2 depicts well 
this theory, too.  On the left-hand side are the firms that benefit or do not suffer 
much from takeover exposure in terms of manager incentives.  These firms 
would be the first to opt for the non-shielded option. In contrast, the firms on 
the right-hand side of the graph needs defenses to protect their managers from 
misjudgment by the market; therefore, producing an unshielded target is overly 
costly for such firms.  Together as a group, all firms produce the upward-
sloping supply curve, which reflects firms’ up-scale taste for defenses.  The 
firm for which the costs and benefits of going public without defenses are equal 
lies at the point at which supply crosses demand (i.e., the dotted curve 
representing the price that the market is willing to pay for an unshielded 
product). All firms to the right of this intersection would refrain from adopting 
defenses, as the costs of production (represented by the supply curve) fall short 
of the benefits (represented by the dotted demand curve). All the firms to the 
left of the intersection would reject defenses since the costs of producing an 
unshielded company top the demand for such companies. 
Tempting in theory, this supply-side explanation has no direct empirical 
backing.  Researchers speculate that certain characteristics of a given firm may 
expose it to an increased threat of market myopia, and hence, defenses are 
especially valuable to such firms.  Specifically, they point to a firm’s level of 
research and development (R&D) expenditure.  The hypothesis is that high 
R&D levels particularly exacerbate market myopia vis-à-vis the particular firm, 
since it is hard to estimate the long-term value of the relevant projects.108 
Consequently, goes the argument, firms with high R&D levels are more likely 
 
term expected earnings.  This finding supports the concerns of many corporate managers 
about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short-term focused institutional 
investors.  See Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over 
Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207 (2001). 
108 This notion was manifested in a recent study that examined a sample of 8313 firms, 
between 1951 and 2001, where firms unexpectedly increased their R&D expenditures by a 
significant amount. Sample firms were found to be undervalued following their R&D 
increases, as manifested in the significantly positive long-term stock returns that the sample 
firms experienced.  The study also found evidence that the sample firms had significantly 
positive long-term abnormal operating performance following their R&D increases.  
Altogether, these findings suggest that R&D increases are beneficial investments and that the 
market is slow to recognize the extent of this benefit, consistent with the investor under-
reaction hypothesis.  See generally Allan C. Ebehart, William Maxwell & Akhtar R. 
Siddique, An Examination of Long-Term Abnormal Stock Returns and Operating 
Performance Following R&D Increases,, 59 J. FIN. 623 (2005). 
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to adopt defenses.109 The data, however, contradict this hypothesis, leaving the 
theory lacking any empirical verification.110 
3. Firm Ability to Adopt Unregulable Defenses 
The third supply-side theory to consider is a novel argument regarding 
unregulable defenses.111 Arlen and Talley argue that, instead of using legally-
based takeover defenses such as staggered boards and poison pills, firms may 
opt for transactional unregulable defenses.  The transactional or “embedded” 
defenses include change-of-control provisions in such business agreements as 
debt instruments, joint venture agreements, leases, license contracts, and 
employment arrangements.112 Because these arrangements mimic transactions 
that are frequently value-increasing, they are not likely to be susceptible to 
legal regulation of any stripe.113 These alternative embedded defenses could be 
quite effective in blocking acquisitions, but they could also be more detrimental 
than legally-based defenses as they are value-diminishing. The reason for this is 
that legally-based defenses such as the poison pill can be easily abolished or 
avoided by management itself, whereas embedded defenses entail the consent 
of a third party and may, therefore, alter the business profile of the firm.114 It 
may thus be wise to allow firms that can easily use embedded defenses to opt 
for the less harmful legally-based alternative. 
Prima facie, this argument seems to suggest that targets (both shielded 
and unshielded) do not vary much in terms of their vulnerability to hostile 
takeovers, since embedded defenses are always an available option for any 
firm.  This interpretation of the argument seems to challenge the idea of a 
market for takeover defenses, since, in the absence of variations in takeover 
vulnerability, shielded products cannot be distinguished from unshielded 
products. However, a closer reading of the new theory reveals that the argument 
is perfectly reconcilable with the theory presented in this paper, as it is actually 
an additional supply-side theory. And as such, it emphasizes that different firms 
enjoy different benefits from adopting legally-based takeover defenses and 
incur different costs for remaining unshielded. 
To understand this point, it should be noted that Arlen and Talley do not 
argue that the firms we see nowadays without harsh takeover defenses are 
actually as protected as their shielded peers since they could always adopt 
substitute transactional defenses.  Rather, they argue that, in a hypothetical 
 
109 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 99. 
110 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 102 (“The coefficient on the R&D variable in 
column A is equally surprising. That coefficient is significant and negative – the opposite of 
what the rational myopia hypothesis predicts.”). 
111 See Arlen & Talley, supra note 11. 
112 Id. at 582 (exemplifying different arrangements that can serve as embedded 
defenses).  
113 Id. at 581 (explaining how the business judgment rule makes embedded defenses 
impervious to legal critique).  
114 Id. at 583 (“unregulable defenses that reduce firm value, not only by deterring 
takeovers (friendly or hostile), but also by inefficiently altering the operating profile of the 
firm outside the takeover context”). 
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world with a prohibition on legally-based defenses, the firms that we see today 
with strong legally-based defenses would be the ones to adopt substitute 
embedded defenses. The reason those firms have legally-based defenses today 
stems from their shareholders’ belief that, in the absence of these defenses, 
management would resort to an even worse means of entrenchment. Granting 
defenses preempts this worst-case scenario. 
This, however, is evidently not the fate of all firms, for otherwise all 
firms would adopt legally-based defenses today, when takeover defenses are 
permitted.  Hence, Arlen and Talley explicitly acknowledge firm heterogeneity, 
which turns their theory into a supply-side explanation from the point of view 
of this article.  Simply put, some firms conduct their business in environments 
in which it is easy for the management to use embedded defenses, while 
managers in other firms do not have ample opportunities to do so.  The Arlen 
and Talley argument could be read as claiming that shareholders at the IPO 
stage can differentiate between these two types of firms and grant harsh 
takeover defenses only to the former type, as they a-priori prefer managers to 
use legally-based shields rather than the more destructive embedded 
counterparts. As stated by the authors,  
“In those situations where managers have little ability to use 
strategic embedded defenses, shareholder choice has much to 
commend it. However, in situations where managers can (and 
would) employ embedded defenses to deter bids, the imposition 
of shareholder choice could prove counter-productive.  We 
therefore doubt that an immutable, one-size-fits-all rule is 
appropriate in such heterogeneous contexts. Rather, courts may 
wish to give increased deference to the choices shareholders 
themselves have made to grant managers power over takeovers 
whenever such choices appear to be clear.”115 
The importance of this argument to the theory put forth in this paper is 
twofold.  First, as discussed so far, it presents an additional supply-side 
consideration, resting on the fact that not all firms are able to use the 
embedded defenses to the same extent. Second, and interestingly, although 
Arlen and Talley believe certain defenses are unregulable, they nonetheless 
seem to also believe that shareholders can assess which firms are most likely 
to use unregulable defenses and preempt this costly possibility by granting 
them takeover defenses at the IPO stage.  Similarly, shareholders can observe 
which firms cannot use harmful substitutes and, accordingly, refrain from 
arming them with takeover defenses.  As we shall see below, the ability to 
assess the takeover vulnerability of peer firms is an important factor in the 
 
115 See Arlen & Talley, supra note 10, at 6, of an older version posted on SSRN at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=398600.  In the published version of the 
paper, the authors make the same claim, although in a slightly less-pronounced manner.  See 
Arlen & Talley, supra note 20, at 585 (“We are skeptical, therefore, that an immutable, one-
size-fits-all rule is appropriate in such heterogeneous contexts.  Rather, courts may wish to 
give increased deference to the choices shareholders themselves have made … .”). 
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demand-side theory to be discussed in Sub-Section C below. The argument 
that shareholders, or at least underwriters on behalf of the shareholders, can 
identify the type of firms that would use unregulable defenses is important to 
my theory in that it indicates the possibility that using unregulable defenses 
does not severely interfere with the assessment of to what extent peer firms 
truly are shielded.  Simply put, the firms that we see today lacking harsh 
defenses are those firms with shareholders who initially believed that their 
management could not easily abuse embedded defenses. Hence, the firms that 
we see today going public without legally-based takeover defenses are, 
indeed, less shielded, even when the possibility of covertly adopting 
embedded defenses is taken into account. 
To conclude, Arlen and Talley’s theory can be read as a provocative 
supply-side argument.  The cost of producing an unshielded target, from their 
point of view, is the possibility that the management of the unshielded target 
will resort to an embedded defense, which is unregulated and especially 
harmful to shareholders.  The extant of this cost fluctuates from firm to firm, 
as not all business environments facilitate the easy adoption of embedded 
defenses. Framed in this manner, this argument can also be understood 
through Figure 2, which explains how it yields a market in which only a 
fraction of the firms adopt defenses. 
On the right-hand side of Figure 2, we find the firms with 
management that could easily adopt embedded defenses.  From the point of 
view of their shareholders, there is a huge cost to “producing” an unshielded 
target, as management would surely resort to the embedded option.  This is 
why the supply curve is at its highest level at that point.  When we move to 
the left-hand side of the graph, firms become more constrained in their ability 
to adopt embedded defenses, and it is therefore less risky to make them go 
public without takeover defenses. At the far end of the line we find the firms 
whose business characteristics entirely prevent them from adopting embedded 
defenses; these firms incur no costs in going public without defenses, at least 
when the only cost considered is the adoption of embedded defenses. Taken 
together, all producers bring about an upward-sloping supply curve, 
representing the escalating costs for going public without defenses. And, 
again, all firms to the left of the intersection between the supply and demand 
curves would go public without defenses, since production costs are lower 
than the benefits of going public unshielded; the opposite is true for the firms 
to the right of the intersection.  The firm sitting at the point of intersection is 
indifferent between the two options. 
 
4. Firms with Different Levels of Private Benefits of Control 
 
Before progressing to the demand-side considerations, I consider another 
supply-side theory that slightly deviates from the pattern outlined above.  This 
fourth theory also can be explained on the backdrop of the framework presented 
in Figure 2, but it requires, first, a modification of the implicit assumptions that 
have served us thus far.  Until now, I have implicitly adopted the classic notion 
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regarding the IPO process, namely, that this process has certain features that 
ensure the inclusion of only optimal corporate governance terms, from the point 
of view of the public shareholders, in the charters of firms that go public.116 
This premise was fundamental to the three previously discussed supply-side 
theories, which argue that some firms adopt defenses at the IPO stage to benefit 
the public shareholders.117 The reasoning underlying this classic view of the 
IPO process is that pre-IPO owners can maximize the value they receive in the 
IPO only if they satisfy the will of the prospective public shareholders under 
the watchful eyes of the underwriters.  A sub-optimal governance term would 
reduce the firm market value in the IPO, which, in turn, would lower the returns 
for the pre-IPO owners.118 The most enthusiastic proponents of this 
explanation summarize the operation of the market forces as follows: “[S]elf-
interested entrepreneurs and managers, just like other investors are driven to 
find the devices most likely to maximize net profit. If they do not, they pay for 
their mistakes because they receive lower prices for corporate paper.”119 
Consequently, pre-IPO owners will always adhere to the advice of 
professionals (such as investment bankers or lawyers) regarding which 
governance terms best serve the public shareholders. 
Recently, however, it was argued that the above reasoning does not 
hold for firms with significant considerations of so-called “private benefits of 
control.”  Aside from generating income for the benefit of all shareholders, 
companies also produce benefits that only the firm’s controller enjoys.  These 
benefits to the controller can take many forms, some of which are often 
wasteful and harmful to the corporation and its public shareholders. Benefits 
to the controller stemming from self-dealing, insider trading in the corporate 
securities, consumption of perks, investment in “pet projects,” or unjustified 
expansion and diversification are all inimical practices that generate private 
benefits.120 In countries with lax legal regimes,121 these types of harmful 
 
116 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8 (presenting the notion of the IPO-certification 
process); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 86, at 6 (describing at length the 
market operation that leads to the adoption of the best business practices). 
117 In the first case, defenses are adopted for bargaining power purposes; in the second 
case, they are adopted to preserve managerial ex-ante incentives; and in the third case, they 
are adopted to preempt the possibility of adoption of embedded defenses.   But in all cases, 
the adoption (or rejection) is meant to benefit the public shareholders. 
118 And in our framework, defenses decisions of IPO-stage firms are supposed to be 
optimal in view of the fact that the securities market carefully prices public offerings and that 
entrepreneurs in such situations are guided by market professionals to adopt the structures 
that the market favors.  The defenses decisions of seasoned firms, in contrast, are not affected 
by such exonerating mechanisms, but as was previously explained, market forces currently 
render the defenses status stagnant after the IPO stage. 
119 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 116, at 6. 
120 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323-29 (1986); Michael C. Jensen, The Free Cash Flow 
Theory of Takeovers: A Financial Perspective on Mergers and Acquisitions and the 
Economy, in THE MERGER BOOM: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT MELVIN 
VILLAGE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1987 CONFERENCE SERIES, 31 BOSTON: FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF BOSTON 102-43 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1988). 
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activities are salient, and there are indications that they impede the 
development of the capital market.122 Other forms of private benefits of 
control may be the mere transfer of value from the public shareholders to the 
controllers, which does not entail any direct waste, such as excessive levels of 
executive compensation.123 In addition, there are types of private benefits that 
the enterprise’s controller amasses without any adverse effect to the firm’s 
value. Such benefits are mostly non-pecuniary ones that attach to the prestige 
of the position, including self-satisfaction from being the controller of the 
enterprise and, accordingly, the social respect and esteem deriving from the 
position,124 and the important factors of political power and reputation. These 
types of private benefits are not bound by the legal regime in which the 
corporation exists. Note that the weight of these control benefits cannot be 
underestimated if we accept that managers are driven not only by monetary 
compensation and perks, but also by prestige, satisfaction, and authority.  
The extent of the private benefits of control naturally fluctuates from firm 
to firm, even within the same country.  The relevant factors are how glamorous 
the firm is, on the one hand, and how open the firm is to abuse by the 
controller, on the other.125 Beyond some threshold of private benefits of control, 
 
121 For an international comparison of the levels of private benefits of control in 
different countries, see Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An 
International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537 (2004).  In this study, control benefits were 
measured indirectly by looking at the premiums (i.e., the price paid beyond the market price) 
when the incumbent controller sold its holding to a new controller.   The idea is that such 
premiums represent the benefits that the minority and public shareholders cannot enjoy. 
122 See A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 
(1997) (empirically linking lax legal regimes and private control benefits with weak and 
concentrated capital markets); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (same); Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (same); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,  Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 
(1997) (same); Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (2000) (same); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (same). 
123 However, much waste may be involved in the process of managerial pay due to 
distorted managerial incentives. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, 
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 751, 761-62 (2002) (describing flaws in the design of managers’ pay and their 
consequences); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (2003) (same); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Pay (2004) (same); Michael 
C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity (Harv. Working Paper No. 04-26; ECGI – 
FIN. Working Paper No. 39/2004) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=480421 (emphasizing 
managers’ perverse incentives in events of market bubble).  
124 See Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 106-07; see also Ronald J. Gilson, 
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy (ECGI—Law Working Paper No. 49/2005) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=784744 (distinguishing between efficient and inefficient controlling 
shareholders and between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of control). 
125 For instance, vast cash flows may provide ample opportunities for managers to 
divert resources to their own benefit in a wasteful manner.  See Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
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it has been shown that pre-IPO owners will install takeover defenses in the 
corporate charter even when those defenses will harm the value of the corporate 
shares.126 The pre-IPO owners may be willing to sustain the decrease in the 
value of the shares because defenses help them preserve their private control 
benefits.  In the absence of defenses, they might receive a higher price per share 
in the IPO, but a hostile bidder may easily wrest the control benefits from their 
hands when taking over the enterprise.127 Therefore, the more private control 
benefits the firm generates, the higher the costs to the pre-IPO owners of going 
public unshielded. 
It can now easily be seen that, once again, we are encountering a supply-
side explanation for the antitakeover practices of IPO-stage firms.  Going back 
to Figure 2, this time the firms with high costs of going public without defenses 
are those that generate high private benefits of control; they appear in declining 
order from right to left, forming the supply curve.  Any firm to the right of the 
intersection between the supply and demand curves has control benefits levels 
that are so high that its costs of going public without defenses are higher than 
the gains from going public without defenses.  Consequently, all firms to the 
right of the intersection will adopt defenses when they go public.  The opposite 
is true with regard to the firms lying to the left of the intersection point, which 
have mild levels of private control benefits. 
Note, however, that there is one major difference between this supply-side 
explanation and the previous ones. The previous three supply-side explanations 
all suggest that both adopting and non-adopting firms opt for the tactic that 
maximizes the market value of the firm.  The current explanation is different in 
its implication that both adopting and non-adopting firms select the tactic that 
 
Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323-29 
(1986) (describing the waste in mature firms that do not need the cash flows they generate for 
any fruitful purpose). 
126 The reason for this is, in essence, that a hostile control transaction does not generally 
compensate the incumbent controller for the loss of private benefits.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
A RENT-PROTECTION THEORY OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (Harvard Law & Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 260, 1999) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=168990. Other versions of the argument 
also exist and are surveyed by Coates, supra note 5, at 1330-32. 
127 To demonstrate, imagine a firm that is worth 100 to the shareholders without 
defenses and additionally provides its managers with non-monetary private benefits of 20 that 
cannot be shared with the public shareholders.  However, without defenses, the chances of a 
takeover that would oust the entrepreneur are 50%, and therefore the entrepreneur values the 
option of taking the firm public without defenses at 110 (i.e., 100 + 50%*20).  Alternatively, 
with defenses, the private benefits would remain the same, but the firm’s inherent value 
would decline to 95 because managers may reject value-enhancing mergers.  For purposes of 
simplicity, let us further assume that the probability of a takeover with defenses is 0. 
Consequently, the entrepreneur would value the company with defenses at 115 (i.e., 95 + 20) 
and would prefer to take the company public with takeover shields (115>110).  Note that the 
value of the firm with defenses in this case would be lower than the comparable value 
without defenses, both in the eyes of the public shareholders (95<100) and from the 
perspective of social welfare (95 + 20 < 100 +20). Nonetheless, the entrepreneur would 
prefer to install defenses to protect her private consumption of control benefits, which would 
be endangered by the prospects of a hostile takeover. 
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maximizes the benefits of the pre-IPO owners, even if that tactic does not 
maximize the market value of the firm.  Takeover shields may be costly to 
adopt, but entrepreneurs may adopt them to protect the private benefits of 
control that are not reflected in the firm’s market value. And if the harm that 
defenses cause to the public shareholders is reflected in the market price at the 
time the firm goes public, then public shareholders do not lose anything by 
buying the stock of shielded companies.128 Indeed, public shareholders pay less 
for firms that adopt defenses, and the cost of adopting defenses is borne by the 
pre-IPO owners who could otherwise receive a better price for the venture.  In 
turn, pre-IPO owners prefer to bear such costs only in firms with ample private 
benefits potential, as explained above.  It should be noted, however, that this 
theory, just like the preceding supply-side explanations, lacks any direct 
empirical verification substantiation.129 
C.  A Novel Demand-Side Argument and the Unified Theory 
 
The four supply-side theories presented above complement one another to 
explain why some firms adopt takeover defenses at the IPO stage while others 
reject such measures.130 A firm is more likely to adopt defenses the more 
important it is to provide management with the power to control the sale of the 
firm, the harder it is to evaluate the firm’s long-term projects, the easier it is for 
management to adopt embedded unregulated defenses, and the more private 
benefits the firm provides to its controller.  The lack of direct empirical 
verification for any of these four explanations is disturbing,131 but it does not 
mean that they are necessarily flawed.  Some effects, such as those related to 
private benefits, are almost impossible to trace  or too delicate to test for or else 
perhaps their empirical examination was not designed properly.132 
128 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409 (2005) (providing evidence that staggered boards bring about reduced firm value). 
129 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 108 (“Thus, at least with respect to this source 
of private benefits, we cannot conclude that defenses use is associated with the presence of 
high private benefits.”). 
130 See infra Section IV.A. and accompanying infra note 201. 
131 Recall that certain versions of two of the above arguments were rejected by the 
empirical examination, while another could be neither verified nor refuted.  See, e.g., Daines 
& Klausner, supra note 5, at 102 (refuting the bargaining power hypothesis); id., at 102 
(refuting the market myopia argument); id., at 108 (unable to either refute or verify the 
private benefits hypothesis).   
132 Some evidence of the private benefits of control theory was found in another 
context, when researchers analyzed the determinants of concentrated ownership.  See S. 
Cheng, V. Nagar, M.V. Rajan, Identifying Control Motives in Managerial Ownership: 
Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation, Rev. Fin. Stud. (2004) (finding that state-mandated 
takeover protection is keyed to a reduction in the level of stock held by the managers, which 
is an alternative means to protect managerial private benefits); Asjeet S. Lamba & Geofrey P. 
Stapledon, THE DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: AUSTRALIAN 
EVIDENCE (Univ. of Melbourne Public Law Research Paper No. 20, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=279015 (finding that firms with higher 
levels of managerial private benefits were more likely to have concentrated ownership); 
Elisabeth Muller, Benefits of Control, Capital Structure and Company Growth (Working 
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In response to the lack of empirical support for the supply-side 
explanations, some researchers have suggested that adoption and rejection 
trends in IPO firms may be the result of certain market failures.  One paper 
suggests that firms vary in legal counsel competence. A second paper suggests 
that some pre-IPO managers are potent enough to trick their pre-IPO 
counterparts into adopting wasteful defenses.  Finally, a third paper notes a 
widely-held though infrequently-cited view that the IPO pricing mechanism is 
imperfect, which may lead to the adoption of detrimental defenses.133 All these 
market failure explanations deviate from the present paper’s antitakeover 
market framework.  I will return to these non-market explanations later on, but 
for now suggest supplementing the existing supply-side theories with novel 
demand-side considerations. Once demand-side considerations are taken into 
account, the conclusions of the different studies that tried to link defense-
adoption trends to market failures in the IPO process could be overreaching.134 
As we shall see below, demand-side considerations are linked to bidders’ 
propensity to pay, in contrast to the supply-side consideration that focuses on 
producers’ (i.e., targets’) characteristics and costs. 
 
1. Constructing a Downward Sloping Demand-Curve 
The demand-side considerations highlighted by this paper derive from a 
notion of diversion of takeover activity.  Unlike other markets, it is well 
acknowledged in the market for corporate control that “[t]he threat of 
competing bids might be insufficient to secure a competitive price because the 
competition in the market for corporate control is far from perfect.”135 The 
essence of the takeover diversion argument is that, in the absence of ample 
M&A opportunities, targets compete among themselves for the prospects of a 
takeover, while bidders compare among different targets in search of the best 
alternative. Consequently, and all things equal, an unshielded target becomes 
more attractive to a bidder if its peers are shielded and therefore harder and 
more expensive to acquire.   
M&A opportunities are often limited due to the increasing trend towards 
intra-industry mergers and acquisition.136 This trend is related to the fact that 
 
Paper, 2005) available at  papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=776364 (finding that 
companies in which existing owners would lose control if they were to expand grow more 
slowly; potential loss of control is measured as the difference in the probability of winning a 
vote for the largest owner before and after a hypothetical equity increase). 
133 However, the authors do not support this view and show that it is not compatible 
with the empirical data.  Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 113. 
134 In other words, while other studies suggest sacrificing the classic understandings 
regarding the IPO process, I suggest reevaluating some firmly-held understandings regarding 
the takeover phenomenon. 
135 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 11, at 930. 
136 See Mehmet E. Akbulut & John G. Matsusaka, The Waning of Corporate 
Diversification (Working Paper, 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=754064 (an 
empirical investigation of bidder returns over the last fifty-five years, showing that, in the 
1990s, diversification fell from favor, while intra-industry mergers were rewarded by the 
market; intra-industry M&A activity is associated with synergies, whereas diversification 
may serve other motives). 
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most acquisitions are synergy-driven and therefore only specific targets 
complement the special needs of specific buyers.137 In these circumstances, 
therefore, the pool of potential bidders is relatively narrow, as has been 
acknowledged by a number of empirical studies that gauged M&A trends. As 
Subramanian recently reported, 
“Figure 2 shows a substantial shift in the deal mix between 
1980s takeovers and 1990s takeovers.  Although the pattern 
does not hold for every industry, the general trend is toward 
more intra-industry acquisitions: in the 1990s, more than three 
quarters of all acquisitions were intra-industry, compared to just 
over half in the 1980s.  These statistics are consistent with 
conventional wisdom characterizing the 1990s takeover wave 
as more strategic and less disciplinary than the 1980s wave.138 
In this reality of a limited number of suitable bidders and a limited amount 
of takeover opportunities, each bidder must compare among relevant targets 
and each target must consider the acts of its peers.139 For the bidders, all 
relevant characteristics of the relevant targets should be weighed, and since 
takeover defenses generate costly delays, the relative antitakeover potency of 
the different targets must also be considered.  In a candid interview to the 
business press, William Steere, Pfizer CEO, discussed the process that led the 
company to launch its bid to acquire Warner Lambert, considered the largest 
hostile takeover in U.S. business history.  The decision to acquire Warner 
Lambert was based on careful analysis of the suitability of other takeover 
alternatives and the acquisition costs of those alternatives.  The costs entailed 
by the need to overcome takeover shields are not mentioned explicitly by 
Steere, but Warner Lambert was cited by the business press as having minimal 
takeover protection and, hence, relatively easy to acquire.140 
To generalize, in picking their target, bidders weigh the relative virtues of 
the potential targets and the relative expected costs or difficulty of their 
acquisition.141 Since takeover defenses increase the costs of acquisition, the 
 
137 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 503 (“Industry takeover volume, in turn, is 
likely to be correlated with the probability of a synergy-producing takeover, where the 
division of gains between the bidder and the target shareholders is likely to be an important 
issue.”). 
138 Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. 
Corp. L. 691, 712 (2003). In addition, mergers are often triggered by industry-specific 
external shocks, resulting in a clustering of acquisition activity within an industry, as 
acknowledged by many studies. See, e.g., M. Gork, An Economic Disturbance Theory of 
Mergers, 83 Q.J. Econ. 624 (1996); Mark L. Mitchell & Harold J. Mulherin, The Impact of 
Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. Fin. Econ. 193 (1996). 
139 This fact was revealed by an empirical study that found that termination of a 
planned merger creates vast stock gains for industry rivals, suggesting that industry rivals are 
takeover alternatives and may be purchased once the merger fails.  See Aigbe Akhigbe et al., 
The Source of Gains to Targets and Their Industry Rivals: Evidence Based on Terminated 
Merger Proposals, 29 FIN. MGMT. 101 (2000). 
140 See Robert Langreth, Behind Pfizer’s Takeover Battle: An Urgent Need, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 8, 2000, at B-1. 
141 The claim that industry peers are takeover substitutes does not mean that all firms 
within an industry are possible alternatives.  Each firm has a reference group with which it 
THE MARKET FOR TAKEOVER DEFENSES 36
relative degree of takeover protection of the potential targets must be taken into 
account.  This means that adoption of shields by a company not only reduces its 
chances of acquisition, but also increases the chances of its unshielded peers to 
be acquired.  The literature has already identified several externalities that a 
firm’s decision to adopt takeover defenses entails, including negative 
externalities for employees, tax authorities, consumer, and bidders.142 However, 
the abovementioned phenomenon of one potential target’s adoption of defenses 
affecting its fellow potential targets is an externality that has not been discussed 
by other authors so far. Rather, the literature has consistently ignored the fact 
that takeover defenses divert some takeover activity, at least within one 
industry sector, from shielded to unshielded corporations. 
The takeover diversion aspect of takeover defenses can be indirectly 
observed in recent empirical findings about takeover activity diversion in 
general.143 While many studies have measured intra-industry merger 
effects,144 this recent study is unique in its analysis of the intra-industry 
effects of merger terminations.  After examining 192 terminated mergers 
between 1987 and 1996, including 57 hostile takeover attempts, the authors 
show that industry peers collect abnormal stock returns once a previously 
announced merger in their industry falls apart.145 The authors’ interpretation 
of this finding is that industry peers are takeover substitutes.  The boost in the 
share prices of peer firms following a failed merger announcement therefore 
reflects the market expectation that these firms might benefit from the 
diverted takeover activity. 
Since other explanations for these results are also possible, especially 
explanations that tie merger activity to the product market,146 the authors 
 
competes.  The adoption of defenses becomes more influential over time with the dispersion 
of ownership, and at that point, the late entrant into the market may be mature enough to 
compete for takeover opportunities with some portion of the market (which I believe may be 
roughly estimated by the underwriters at the IPO stage). 
142 The contemporary literature has identified various other externalities. See, e.g., 
Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, One Share, One Vote, and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988) (negative externalities on bidders); Lucian A. Bebchuk 
& Luigi Zingalas, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES: PRIVATE VERSUS SOCIAL 
OPTIMALITY) (NBER Working Paper Series, 1997) (externalities on corporate bidders); 
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan Auerbach ed., 1988) 
(externalities on the employees of takeover targets); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for 
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982) 
(externalities on consumers, tax authorities, etc.). 
143 See Akhigbe et al., supra note 12. 
144 See, e.g., B. Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. 
Fin. Econ. 241 (1983); S. Chatterjee, Types of Synergy and Economic Value: The Impact of 
Acquisitions on Merging and Rival Firms, 7 Strategic Mgmt. J. 119 (1986); M. Song & R. 
Walking, Abnormal Returns to Rivals of Acquisition Targets: A Test of the Acquisition 
Probability Hypothesis, 55 J. Fin. Econ. 143 (2000). 
145 See Akhigbe et al., supra note 12, at 110 (“merger termination results in significant 
negative returns for targets and targets rivals experience significant positive returns.”). 
146 For instance, one could imagine that the merger threatened the market power (in the 
market for products) or all rivals of the merging entities, and once the merger failed, this 
threat was removed, boosting the stock prices of the competitors. 
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conducted a few additional tests to verify their hypothesis. To begin with, the 
authors found that the size of the peer firms relative to the target is inversely 
related to the gains to those peer firms from the merger termination.147 Since 
there is ample evidence that firm size is an impediment to takeover bids,148 
this test supports the takeover diversion explanation. Second, the authors 
found that peer firms in regulated industries, such as banking, utilities, and 
transportation, experience less favorable abnormal returns when the merger 
termination is announced.149 And since regulatory approval may partially 
impede takeover activity, this test also backs the takeover diversion 
explanation. Finally, the authors showed that an index of product market 
concentration (the Herfindahl Index) has no statistically significant influence 
on a rival’s returns,150 which indicates that product market explanations 
cannot shed any light on the study’s principal findings. 
Taken together, the above findings, which prove that peer firms are 
substitute candidates and that takeover activity can be diverted from firm to 
firm, also indirectly support the argument that takeover shields divert takeover 
activity.  If defenses are potent enough to reduce the M&A potential of a 
shielded target, as other studies clearly show,151 they should create a similar 
reaction to that provoked by a merger termination.  And this diverted takeover 
activity, which constitutes a benefit for peer firms, raises demand-side 
considerations as it involves bidder willingness to pay for shielded and 
unshielded targets. 
It is now possible to translate the takeover diversion argument into a 
demand-side theory of takeover defenses that supplements the supply-side 
theories in order to construct a market for takeover defenses.152 The familiar 
framework developed earlier appears again in Figure 3 below, which now 
includes demand-side considerations. 
 
147 Id., at 109 (“Thus, the larger the average size of rivals relative to the target, the 
lower the probability that thye will become acquisition targets and, hence, the lower the 
CARs.”). 
148 See, e.g., K. Palepu, Predicting Takeover Targets, 8 J. Accounting & Econ. 3 
(1986); M. Song & R. Walking, The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition 
Attempts and Target Shareholder Wealth, 28 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 1935 (1993). 
149 Id., at 109 (“This finding is consistent with the assertion that the need for regulatory 
approval of acquisitions might reduce the likelihood of regulated firms becoming takeover 
targets.”).. 
150 Id., at 109. 
151 The above statement is true for both hostile and friendly M&A activity. See 
Bebchuk et al., supra note 40 (empirical findings on hostile transactions); Field & Karpoff, 
supra note 5, at 1877 (empirical findings on all transactions). 
152 Absent a supply-side theory, the mere belief in diversion of takeover activity does 
not mandate the conclusion that only a portion of the firms adopt defenses.  Theoretically, 
defenses may be harmful for the shareholders of the adopting firm even when very few firms 
remain unshielded and diversion of takeover activity peaks.  The opposite scenario is also 
possible, however. 
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Figure 3: The Demand-Side
Unshielded Firms
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Figure 3 above draws a full picture of the market for takeover defenses.  
Like its predecessors, it shows an upward sloping supply curve, which is the 
result of the combination of all supply-side theories discussed earlier.  
Differences among issuers in terms of private benefits, propensity to adopt 
unregulated defenses, or any other relevant factor are reflected in different costs 
of foregoing defenses.  The firms on the left-hand side of the graph have 
extremely low costs for going public without defenses; issuers are aligned, from 
left to right, in ascending order of costs forgoing defenses. But for the first 
time, we now explicitly take into account bidder’s perspective, which translates 
into the price that the market is willing to pay for the product. This factor is 
reflected in the downward sloping demand curve in Figure 3.This downward 
slope, which is common to most product markets,153 means that the market 
price drops as more products are introduced onto the market. The fewer 
products available on the market, the higher the price for each product. This is 
the precise influence of takeover diversion on the market for takeover 
defenses.154 A bidder—i.e., the consumer of the unshielded products in our 
market—will be willing to pay more for unshielded targets when few such 
products are available.  When many firms are shielded, their unshielded 
counterparts receive much attention, which is diverted from the shielded types, 
leading to higher takeover frequency.155 Higher takeover frequency then 
translates into greater takeover premiums for the shareholders of the target. 
And, all things equal, as the market becomes saturated with defenses, this 
phenomenon intensifies.  Conversely, when fewer firms adopt defenses, more 
unshielded types are produced, which have to share the lower diverted levels of 
takeover activity. This leads to fewer takeovers and less takeover premiums for 
 
153 See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 2, at 21-23 (depicting and discussing 
downward sloping demand). 
154 In product markets, this phenomenon stems from the fact that consumers have 
different evaluations for the same products.  Hence, in order to sell more products, producers 
must tap consumers with lower valuations. 
155 In Appendix 1, infra, I present a simple model of two targets and two bidders, in 
which takeover diversion sometimes leads to competition over the unshielded firm, thereby 
increasing the premiums the target could expect. 
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the shareholders of the unshielded target, making the unshielded tactic less 
attractive. 
Now, in order to expose the equilibrium (i.e., fraction of the market that 
adopts defenses and the fraction of the market that reject them), we need to 
compare the costs of going public unshielded with the benefits of this tactic.  
All firms for which the costs of going public unshielded are lower than the 
price that the market is willing to pay for an unshielded target will go public 
without defenses and vice versa. This is true for all firms to the left of the 
intersection between supply and demand, reflected by the fact that the demand 
curve tops the supply curve.  And all firms to the right of the intersection will 
adopt defenses, as going public without defenses is too costly for them when 
costs are compared with the benefits. The point of intersection represents the 
equilibrium itself, and the marginal firm at that point is indifferent between 
defense adoption and rejection, since costs and benefits are equal. 
In the absence of demand-side considerations, each issuer has to 
concentrate on its own characteristics and decide whether it would do better 
with or without defenses.  This is the essence of the supply-side explanations, 
which refer to demand as though it is fixed.  The abovementioned demand-side 
explanation holds that attention to the issuer’s characteristics is only part of the 
necessary considerations.  Observing the state of the relevant industry is also 
necessary, since demand for unshielded target rises when more firms adopt 
shields. The existence of the demand-side considerations does not have to be 
apparent to the market.  The data (or hunches) used in the normal decision-
making process with regard to defense adoption will be affected by the unseen 
forces of demand.  Hence, it is perfectly reasonable for underwriters to more 
strongly advocate defenses in some industries, which are not saturated with 
defenses, while relatively opposing them in industries that are replete with 
defenses.  However, this may happen even if underwriters are unaware of the 
reason that led one industry (that which is saturated with defenses) to be a more 
favorable environment for unshielded firms. 
In this framework, the demand-side argument and the different supply-side 
explanations complement one another.  However, and since the empirical 
literature was unable to verify any of the supply-side influences, it is also 
important to note that the demand-side argument has much explanatory force 
even in the absence of the supply considerations.  Put differently, even if firms’ 
heterogeneity does not play a role in the adoption or rejection of defenses, the 
forces of demand may still lead to only a fraction of the firms’ adopting 
defenses.  The reason for this is that takeover diversion erodes any benefits 
accompanying going public with defenses, notwithstanding firms’ internal 
motivations.  All things equal, the adoption of defenses by peers increases the 
attractiveness of rejecting shields. Hence, even among similar firms, there may 
be some fraction of the market in which the benefits of defenses equal the 
benefits of being unshielded.   This latter scenario is more intriguing than the 
one in which target are heterogeneous since it is unclear which firms would opt 
for defenses and which firms would reject them, and the process in which the 
market reaches the right balance is obscure.  This matter warrants a separate 
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explanation of an evolutionary nature, which appears at the end of the 
discussion of the demand-side considerations.156 
2.  Demand-Side and Executive Pay 
 
The downward sloping demand curve rests on the notion of takeover 
diversion.  Two issues related to executive pay are relevant here.  One, if 
managers’ compensation is heavily tied to the performance of the firm’s stock, 
managers may cede to a hostile bidder even if they have potent takeover 
defenses.157 The premium offered in the takeover could compensate them for 
any benefit lost in the transaction.158 In turn, takeover defenses will not impede 
bids, and no takeover diversion will take place.  Second, and related, if a bidder 
is able to make side-payments to the management of the target, those managers 
may waive the battle and opt for the side-payments.159 Once again, takeover 
defenses would not forestall bids, and no takeover diversion would take place. 
In both scenarios, the managers are analogous to security guards at a mansion. 
Effective guards deter criminal activity directed at the mansion they are 
protecting, but also divert such activity to neighboring mansions.  A guard who 
receives part of the plunder welcomes the criminal activity, which undercuts 
deterrence and diversion alike.  There is a vast difference, however, between 
the two management scenarios. In the first scenario, the bidder must raise the 
price paid to all shareholders of the target in order to convince the managers to 
cede control, since the managers’ gains accrue through their fractional holdings 
of the firm’s stock (or options, etc.).  In the second scenario, a side-payment 
could have the same effect on the managers, but without requiring that the 
bidder extend generous offers to all shareholders. This difference requires us to 
analyze each case separately, but as we shall see below, in reality, both 
executive incentive pay and a bidder’s ability to make side-payments do not 
rule-out takeover diversion. 
Before theoretically considering the two issues, we must first acknowledge 
that there is sound empirical evidence that takeover defenses serve as effective 
guards against takeovers, notwithstanding the two scenarios mentioned above.  
In a recent study, Bebchuk, Coates, and Subraminian found that harsh 
antitakeover defenses (staggered boards) significantly reduce the likelihood of a 
 
156 Infra Section IV. 
157 Incentive pay is a common measure in the United States and is persistently on the 
rise.  The reasons for this trend lie beyond the boundaries of takeover considerations.  See,
e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, 
But How, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 138 (1990) (stressing the importance of this measure to align 
shareholder/manager interests).  But cf. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) 
(explaining how managers turned incentive pay from a solution into a problem); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 764-74 (2002). 
158 See Stulz, supra note 67 (a formal model of the managerial decision problem in such 
setting). 
159 For a model that includes a feature that allows the bidder to make a side-payment 
that goes directly to the incumbent managers, see Arlen & Talley, supra note 10, at 642. 
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target’s being acquired once a hostile bid is launched. In their sample, nine 
months after a hostile bid had been launched, 60% of the targets with staggered 
boards remained independent, strikingly compared to only 34% among targets 
without a staggered board.160 Moreover, while Bebchuk, Coates, and 
Subramanian measured the effect of takeover defenses on hostile takeovers, 
Field and Karpoff measured their impact on overall M&A activity, i.e., both 
negotiated and unsolicited transactions. In the latter sample, the overall 
probability of a takeover event for both types of transactions was 16.8% for 
firms without takeover defenses and 11.4% for firms armed with at least one 
defense, a salient difference of 5.4%.161 The impact of takeover defenses can, 
therefore, hardly be denied. 
Let us first consider why managers’ incentive pay does not entirely erode 
most of the impact of defenses.  The answer is that incentive pay can be 
designed so as to render defenses almost obsolete, but shareholders have no 
interest in doing so.  The first reason is, simply, that motivating managers to 
accept all bids might be extremely expensive.  The higher the fraction of the 
firm held by managers, the larger their benefits from an acquisition.  Consider, 
for instance, a bidder that is willing to pay 1 billion dollars above the target’s 
market price, and assume that the manager derives overall benefits of 10 
million dollars from her stint at the firm.  In order to convince the manager to 
accept the bid, the shareholders must design the manager’s incentive pay in a 
manner that would ensure her at least 1% of the firm’s stock (1% of 1 billion = 
10 million).162 At any lower fraction, the manager would prefer to maintain her 
position at the firm and to try to fend off the bid. But stock or an option grant of 
1% might be too expensive a measure for the shareholders.  And note that the 
cost to the shareholders increases if they want their manager to accommodate 
bidders with a lower valuation of the firm. 
The second reason why shareholders have no interest in calibrating 
incentive pay so as to neutralize defenses is more intriguing: shareholders use 
the combination of executive pay and defenses for strategic reasons.  In a 
recent paper, Kahan and Rock explain how incentive pay can fine-tune 
shareholders usage of takeover defenses to extract high takeover bids.  In 
accordance with the numerical example set out above, when shareholders set 
incentive pay, they actually set a minimal price for a takeover that the 
managers would not oppose. In setting the threshold, goes the Kahan and 
Rock argument, shareholders must balance between their desire to induce 
high-value bidders to pay high premiums and the loss of bids from bidders 
 
160 See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 40, at 930. Similar findings 
obtained thirty months after the hostile bid had been launched. Forty-seven percent of the 
targets with staggered boards remained independent versus 23% of the targets without 
staggered boards. Id. at 933. 
161 See Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1877. 
162 The above numbers regarding managerial fractional holdings are quite realistic.  In 
the U.S., manager fractional ownership is typically extremely low relative to the situation in 
most other countries.  See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999).  
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who cannot meet the threshold.163 Moreover, explain Kahan and Rock, this is 
true also for any other measure that shareholders may take to restrain 
management resistance to takeovers: 
“[C]ompanies can (and do) adopt devices that reduce the degree 
and effectiveness of managerial resistance as the premium rises—for 
example, by granting managers stock options (which become more 
valuable as the premium increases) or by having outside directors 
placed on the board who are not fully beholden to management (who 
may overrule managers reluctant to accept a high-premium offer). As 
a result, conflict of interest may induce a board to reject low 
premium bids, but not bids where the premium is sufficiently high. 
This, however, may be exactly the selling strategy shareholders 
would want to pursue.”164 
Altogether, it is therefore not surprising that shareholders do not choose 
to mute manager resistance to the point that takeover defenses are rendered 
non-functional. In fact, this may be the reason for the adoption of defenses in 
the first place.165 
Let us now turn to bidders’ motivation to privately “bribe” managers into 
accepting their bids.  While bidders may want to make such side-payments, 
the empirical findings that takeover defenses deter all types of M&A 
transactions166 suggest that, even in friendly transactions, the ability to make 
such side-payments is limited, for otherwise, takeover defenses would have 
no substantial deterrence potency and shareholders could not use them for 
strategic reasons. There are at least five limitations on bidders’ ability to 
convince managers to accept a bid through side-payments, although it cannot 
be denied that some side-payments do take place.167 For one, federal 
securities regulation prohibits bidders from buying management’s stock at a 
different price from that offered to the public in the tender offer.  Second, the 
case law prohibits managers from “selling” their positions in the company.168 
Third, severance pay in the event of a hostile bid, also know as “golden 
 
163 In an earlier paper, the authors showed that the use of incentive pay (such as option 
grants) and other mechanisms can mute the effect of antitakeover mechanisms.  See Kahan & 
Rock (2002), supra note 18.  However, in the more recent article, they clarify that 
shareholders have no interest in muting the effects of defenses, but, rather, use them to their 
advantage as a credible commitment to accepting only high-premium offers. Put differently, 
shareholders have no reason to worry about defenses since defenses can be manipulated and 
not because defenses are silenced. 
164 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 487. 
165 This view, however, is not shared by all scholars. See Guhan Subramanian, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 Yale L.J. 621 (2003) (arguing that there 
is no evidence that defenses are actually used for bargaining purposes). 
166 See Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1877. 
167 See, for example, the famous case of Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) 
(managers’ resistance dropped after they obtained employment agreements). 
168 Manson v. Curtis, court of appeals of New York, 223 N.Y. 313; 119 N.E. 559 
(1918). 
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parachute” arrangements,169 is limited by penalty tax laws.170 Fourth, while it 
is possible to compensate the managers of a target with lucrative consulting 
agreements and other such tactics,171 this manner of compensation often will 
not constitute adequate compensation for their loss of private benefits.  The 
reason for this is that much, if not most, of the private benefits that 
accompany a managerial stint are of a psychological nature (including social 
status, self-esteem, the feeling of being in charge of the enterprise, and even 
the accompanying political influence),172 which cannot be easily detached 
from the CEO or other managerial title. Hence, it would take much to 
convince many managers to forego their positions, especially those who are 
not approaching retirement age173 and those who are already wealthy enough. 
Finally, at least some managers will consider it unethical to cut a good deal 
for themselves rather than insisting on high premiums for all shareholders.  
Altogether, therefore, there is good reason why side-payments from the 
bidder do not neutralize the power of defenses to reject and divert bids, nor do 
they invalidate demand-side considerations.174 
169 Since these arrangements are designed by the targets and not by the bidders, it 
should also be noted that shareholders have no interest in arrangements that would nullify 
defenses.  For instance, assume that the manager values her position at the firm at 20 million 
dollars and that shareholders want to attract a bid of 1 billion dollars (above the target’s 
market price).  In the absence of a golden parachute, the shareholders would have to grant the 
manager options for 2% of the company stock to guarantee her approval (2% of 1 billion = 
20 million). However, the shareholders may combine stock options with a golden parachute 
arrangement.  For instance, a golden parachute of 10 million dollars would allow them to 
reduce the option grant to 1% of the firm stock (10 million + 1% of 1 billion = 20 million). 
They would not want to make the golden parachute so lucrative as to cause the manager to 
accept any bid, which, in the example above, would happen if the golden parachute were set 
at 20 million or more.  The advantage to using a golden parachute and not only stock option 
grants is that a golden parachute is an expense that materializes only if a takeover occurs, 
whereas a stock option is an expense regardless of whether the takeover occurs, as 
recognized by the recently amended accounting standards. See Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123 (revised 2004) Share- Based Payment. 
170 In fact, the excise tax is so extreme that literally no firm ever exceeds the limits 
imposed by these laws. See Rocap et al., Revisiting Golden Parachutes, 102 Tax Notes 
(2004). 
171 Note, however, that for reasons connected to their personalities and business views, 
many managers simply cannot stay on-board after an acquisition (even if it is structured as a 
friendly one) to play second fiddle.  
172 This description fits the U.S., where the legal environment is considered strict and, 
therefore, restrictive of the most lethal opportunities for managerial consumption of private 
benefits such as massive self-dealing.  See, e.g., Andrey Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). 
173 It is a widely-acknowledged fact that managers approaching retirement age are more 
eager to sell their firms. See, for instance, the famous insinuation made by the court in Smith 
v. Van Gorkom (“It is noteworthy in this connection that he was then approaching 65 years of 
age and mandatory retirement.”), 488 Del. A.2d 858, 866 (1985). 
174 More generally, when some side-payments are possible, shareholders can calibrate 
incentive pay so that only high-value bids will be accommodated by management. If Ps 
denotes premiums paid to the entire shareholder body (including the manager), Pm denotes 
the direct side-payment to the manager, PB denotes the private benefits that the manager 
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IV. THE MECHANISMS OF THE MARKET FOR TAKEOVER DEFENSES 
Since market participants are probably unaware of all the delicacies of the 
market for takeover defenses, especially the demand-side forces, it is important 
to discuss the market mechanisms that maintain the equilibrium in this unique 
market.  Until now, I have emphasized the case in which supply-side 
considerations and demand-side forces work in concert.  If this is the case in 
reality in this market, then the theory presented in this paper is no more 
demanding of market participants than any supply-side theory.  Recall that 
supply-side explanations assert that firms differ and therefore each firm (or, 
perhaps more realistically, each firm’s investment banker) decides whether 
takeover defenses is suitable for it or not.  
This evaluation of suitability by the issuer or its underwriter, under any 
supply-side theories, must take into account the costs and benefits of the 
takeover defense adoption, as well as the anticipated takeover frequency and 
premiums paid for unshielded firms in contrast to shielded firms.  Adding the 
demand-side theory to the mix does nothing to change this evaluation process.  
However, takeover diversion from shielded to unshielded firms increases the 
benefits of going public unshielded.  Investment bankers or issuers do not have 
to acknowledge the sources of such phenomena in order to make the right 
choice.  When market participants develop a professional hunch or actually 
measure the benefits of going public without defenses, the unnoticeable 
influence of the demand forces is already present. Demand forces tilt the 
benchmark so that being unshielded offers more benefits than would be the case 
in the absence of demand-side effects.   
Recall, however, that this paper also argues that demand-side forces may 
lead shed some light on issuers’ diverse antitakeover practices, even if supply-
side explanations are not particularly compelling.  In such a scenario, all firms 
in a certain market sector have similar preferences regarding defenses at the 
stage of going public.  This scenario is important to consider since the empirical 
literature could find no correlation between a firm’s relevant characteristics and 
defense adoption or rejection trends.  Interestingly, the absence of supply-side 
forces does not seem to undermine the demand-side theory.  Takeover diversion 
still erodes the benefits of going public with defenses, and this erosion 
intensifies the more firms adopts defenses.  Furthermore, it is therefore possible 
that at some point, when only a fraction of the market has shields, the benefits 
of going public with shields will be equal to the benefits of going public 
without shields. 
However, recall that in the absence of supply forces, all firms share similar 
relevant characteristics at the stage when they go public.  This means that with 
 
enjoys from her stint at the firm, and  denotes the manager’s fractional holding after the 
incentive compensation, then only bids that meet the following conditions will be acceptable 
to the manager: 
 Ps ^ 
PmPB 
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the right fraction of defenses in the market, all firms (and not only the marginal 
firm at the point of intersection between supply and demand) are indifferent to 
defense adoption or rejection at the IPO stage.175 If this peculiar eventuality 
does occur, it quite an enigma as to how firms decide whether to adopt or reject 
defenses so that the market reaches the right balance, especially if market 
participants are unaware of the demand-side forces. 176 
I therefore suggest that a simple evolutionary process leads the market to 
the stable state where only some of the firms adopt defenses at the IPO stage, 
even if at that stage all firms are quite similar in terms of their preferences.  In 
Figure 4 below, the familiar downward sloping demand curve is present, the 
product of takeover diversion. Recall that the demand for unshielded firms 
reflects the benefits for going public unshielded and that this benefit 
diminishes the more unshielded firms there are, since there are less shielded 
firms that divert takeover activity and more unshielded counterparts with 
whom to share the diverted benefits.  Commensurate with our current 
assumptions, the supply curve in Figure 4 is entirely flat, reflecting that the 
costs of going public without shields are similar for all firms.  Recall also that 
the costs of producing an unshielded target are actually the foregone benefits 
of being shielded. The supply curve for unshielded firms therefore also 
represents the benefits derived by each firm from adopting defenses. 
 
175 If this is the case, then it is no wonder that the vast body of empirical research has 
never been able to provide a clear answer as to whether takeover defenses are harmful or 
beneficial to shareholders.  See, e.g., DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 93; Scott Linn & John 
McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on 
Common Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 361-39 (1983); Gregg Jarrell & Annette Poulsen, 
Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 
J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1987); Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and 
the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143-61 (1990); Victoria McWilliams & Nilanjan Sen, Board 
Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 491-505 
(1997). 
176 Perhaps the following analogy would be helpful.  When car manufacturers decide on 
the location of the gas tank intake, they should take into account that approximately 50% of 
the fueling spots in gas stations fit left-side intakes and 50% fit right-side intakes.  If 
manufacturers fail to pay attention to this fact, much discomfort may result to some of the 
drivers (those who purchased a car with an intake of the type with which the market is 
saturated).  However, as long as the market is more or less at an equilibrium, all drivers (and 
manufacturers) are indifferent tp having (or producing) a left-side or right-side intake.  
Assuming this indifference, it would be interesting to identify the mechanism that keeps the 
market at equilibrium. 
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Figure 4: The Market Mechanism
Unshielded Firms
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D = demand (benefit of the unshielded tactic)
S = supply (benefit of the shielded tactic)
As in the previous Figures, the intersection of the supply and demand 
curves marks the fact that diversion of takeover activity has eroded the 
benefits of defenses to the point where only part of the market should adopt 
defenses in equilibrium.177 To illustrate how this can happen when all firms 
share the same preferences, let us first assume that when a given IPO-stage 
firm enters the market, all incumbent targets have takeover shields.  The spot 
on the graph reflecting this state of the market is X = 0 since the x-axis charts 
the number of unshielded firms in the market.  In this state, it is wise for a 
firm going public not to adopt shields.  The reason is that on the left side of 
Figure 4 in general and at X=0 in particular, the demand curve, representing 
the benefits of being unshielded, tops the supply curve, which represents the 
benefits of being shielded.  The issuer or its professional advisors (investment 
bankers, etc.) may make this decision without being aware of the fact that the 
relative advantage of being unshielded at this stage stems from intensified 
takeover diversion or that this fact may change over time.  All that is 
necessary for making this decision is a familiarity with the market and the 
potential M&A activity for each unshielded and shielded type of firm.  This 
familiarity may be the result of articulated takeover data-processing 
conducted by research departments or professional hunches or both 
combined. 
Now let us assume that another firm is about to go public and has to 
decide whether or not to adopt shields. By now, the picture is slightly 
different since the market is no longer at X=0, because the former IPO stage 
firm decided to go public without shields.  Nevertheless, the second firm will 
also reject defenses, since being unshielded still provides more benefits than 
going public with shields.  This is manifested in Figure 4 by the fact that 
demand tops supply.  But as more firms going public receive the same advice 
and reject shields, the market gradually moves to the right on the X-axis, with 
 
177 If supply and demand do not intersect, defenses are either entirely harmful or 
entirely beneficial for all firms.   This result is commensurate with the arguments of the 
classic literature.  See Infra Section III.A. 
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the number of unshielded firms increasing.  Firms going public will reject 
adopting defenses until the point at which demand intersects with supply.  At 
the point of intersection, takeover adoption or rejection makes no difference, 
and market professionals cannot and should not develop any hunches with 
regard to the desirability of defense adoption. Moreover, as long as the 
market maintains this state, takeover defenses should not be adopted or 
rejected in any sort of systematic manner, so as to both serve the benefit of 
the individual target and preserve the market equilibrium. 
Furthermore, any shift back to the left side of the X-axis in Figure 4 
would activate the market mechanisms discussed above. In the same gradual 
process described above, the market would slide back on the demand curve to 
the point of intersection between supply and demand.  This process, as can be 
expected, would be mirrored for any shift to a point to the right of the 
intersection. To illustrate this, let us consider the case of a firm that goes 
public when all other available targets are unshielded. The firm’s advisors 
would estimate that it is better to be shielded when all others are unshielded.  
This state is reflected in Figure 4 by the fact that supply tops demand.  Once 
again, there is no requirement that market experts identify that the relative 
advantage of being shielded stems, among other things, from the fact that all 
firms are unshielded.  Following the first firm, other firms will go public with 
shields, moving the market to the left of the X-axis, where a smaller fraction 
of the firms is unshielded, until the point of intersection.  Instead of sliding 
down the demand-curve, as described in the previous example, here the 
market climbs up to the equilibrium.  The point of intersection is stable in the 
sense that market mechanisms will correct any deviation therefrom in one of 
the two processes discussed above. 
This explanation may also elucidate another mystery surrounding the 
antitakoever practices of IPO-stage firms. As Coates reports, over the 1990s, 
the rate of defense adoption among IPO-stage firms grew dramatically.  Coates 
argues that this tendency may have been the result of a beneficial learning 
process among lawyers handling IPOs.178 But the evolutionary process 
described above proposes quite a different explanation, much more critical of 
current legal counsel.  
The literature argues that underwriters serve as the gatekeepers against the 
incorporation of improper governance terms in the charters of firms that go 
public.179 If issuers insist on such terms, the underwriters penalize them by 
reducing their valuation, which, in turn, prevents the issuers from making the 
wrong choices. However, if firms are similar in their takeover defense 
preferences, as Coates suggests,180 and if the market is at the point of supply-
and-demand intersection where all firms are indifferent between defense 
adoption and rejection, then underwriters’ valuations of issuers would not 
 
178 Coates, supra note 5, at 1379, 1383 (suggesting that high profile events in the 1990s 
made Silicon Valley law firms adopt the antitakeover practices of their New York peers). 
179 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8. 
180 Coates, supra note 5, at 1385 (interpreting the empirical findings about firm 
similarity to suggest that defenses are optimal for all firms). 
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fluctuate with any defense-adoption or rejection decisions.181 The issuers’ legal 
counsel may interpret this underwriter indifference to the defenses question as a 
sign that defenses are always benign factors in a firm’s valuation,182 while in 
fact this is true only when the market is at or close to the equilibrium.  Hence, 
counsel may always advise their clients to adopt defenses at the IPO stage.  The 
managers of the issuers would favor such advice, for when adopting defenses 
does not harm the valuation of the firm, they only benefit the managers in help 
them hold onto their precious positions. 
This systematic legal advice, however, tilts the market from the 
equilibrium.  The market becomes saturated with shielded targets that divert 
takeover activity to unshielded peers, making defense rejection a more 
favorable strategy.  At first, the harm to the adopting firms is unnoticeable, 
since the process is gradual and especially harmful only when the market is 
extremely off-balance. Eventually, however, when the costs of going public 
without defenses are much higher than the benefits (reflected by a sharp 
diversion between supply and demand), the harm becomes salient.  Finally, 
market participants will identify that foregoing defenses is the more favorable 
strategy and will launch the process that will push the market back to the point 
of equilibrium by systematically opposing defenses. 
It is noteworthy that the process above refers to defenses as though their 
adoption is possible only at the going–public stage.  Since this assumption is far 
from trivial, a few more words of clarification are warranted.  To start with, I 
would emphasize that the discussion does not deal with all possible types of 
antitakeover measures, but, rather, only with antitakeover charter provisions.  
The key difference between the latter and any other takeover measure and 
maneuver is that antitakeover charter provisions require shareholder consent. 
Boards can adopt at any stage unilateral antitakeover measures that do not 
require shareholder consent, first and foremost, the poison pills.183 The ease 
 
181 This conclusion is not valid if the advantages of defenses are based on the private-
benefits-of-control theory.  Recall that under this supply-side theory, in equilibrium the pre-
IPO owners are indifferent between defenses adoption and rejection, but the valuation of 
firms adopting defenses will be lower than the valuation of firms rejecting them.  The reason 
for this is that under this supply theory, the benefits accrued due to defenses are not reflected 
in the market value of the firm, since they accrue privately to the managerial team and not to 
the public shareholders.  Note that the private-benefits theory can explain the institutional 
shareholders’ disapproval of defense adoption in seasoned firms.  While defenses are priced 
at the IPO stage and some issuers nevertheless choose to adopt them, their adoption hurts the 
value of the firm later on for the public shareholders, who do not receive compensation for 
this harm.  For a discussion that most clearly presents the question of institutional investor 
preferences regarding defenses, see Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private 
Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 20 (2003). 
182 In Merton Miller’s jargon, it means that takeover defenses are innocuous or “neutral 
mutations” in the design of corporate securities.  Merton Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN.
261, 273 (1977). 
183 Theoretically, shareholders can install at the IPO stage a charter provision that 
forbids adopting a poison pill, but practically no firm has such an explicit provision and only 
few firms have an implicit restriction.  Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 85 (“Furthermore, 
we find that no firms adopt charter terms committing themselves to avoid subsequent 
adoption of ATPs”).. 
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with which they can be adopted is so great that one scholar argued that any 
target without a poison pill actually has a “shadow pill” since it can easily adopt 
one at time.184 This means that it is almost impossible to speak about 
differences in the actual antitakeover protection of different firms when 
unilateral takeover defenses are at stake. 
Nevertheless, unilateral takeover defenses are only the first layer of 
defenses.  Antitakeover charter provisions, and, primarily, charter provisions 
that create staggered boards, evidently add significant antitakeover potency to 
the target.185 These effective charter provisions may be included in the charter 
before going public or added down the road as a charter amendment requiring 
the consent of both the board and the shareholders.186 However, in practice, 
since the early 1990s, decisions regarding antitakeover charter provisions that 
are made at the IPO stage have hardly ever been modified at a later stage.187 
As noted by Coates, “[T]he moment prior to going public is the one time at 
which U.S. companies have been able with certainty to reduce their legal 
takeover vulnerability… . Only at the IPO stage does a company continue to 
have the ability to choose different types and amounts of defenses that will 
regulate hostile bids for the life of the company.” This is true with respect to 
both shield removal (which is quite understandable since managers have veto 
power over charter amendments) and decisions to adopt shields.188 
The inability of firms to deviate from the status quo that was set at the 
time they went public is part of a more general phenomenon of corporate 
stagnation, which I have analyzed elsewhere.189 Corporate stagnation means 
that corporate governance structures and provisions are sticky in the sense 
that mature firms have very restricted ability to remove existing arrangements 
or add new ones.  One side of this equation—the inability to remove existing 
arrangements—is quite understandable in the context of antitakeover charter 
provisions. Since any amendment to the corporate charter requires the consent 
of managers and shareholders alike, managers will be reluctant to part with a 
provision that protects their positions and related benefits.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that managers rarely cave in to shareholders advisory resolutions to 
declassify the board, which have been gaining considerable support among 
shareholders since the beginning of the 1990s.190 
The answer is more complicated with regard to the inability of firms to 
add new takeover defenses (that require shareholder consent) after the IPO 
 
184 Coates, supra note 21. 
185 Bebchuk et al., supra note 95. 
186 See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit 8, s 242(b) (1991); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT s. 10.03 
(a)-(c) (1985). 
187 Coates, supra note 5, at 1308. Coates then continues to review the rarity of new 
defenses being adopted post-IPO. 
188 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 82, at 723. 
189 See Hannes, supra note 13.  Other papers discuss the hardships involved in 
reversing existing arrangements. See also, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410-13 (1989) (discussing the 
impact of managers’ control over charter amendments). 
190 See Coates, supra note 33, at 861 tbl. 5. 
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stage.  The empirical evidence discussed above indicates that shareholders are 
unwilling renegotiate a decision made at the IPO stage to reject shields. There 
are a few possible reasons for the fact that shareholders prefer to make their 
decisions at the IPO stage and not thereafter.  First, a decision following the 
IPO stage entails costly solicitation and raises problems of joint action among 
shareholders.191 Second, and related, a decision at the IPO stage is made for 
the public investors under the scrutiny of underwriters, and it is therefore 
usually considered an articulated decision (although underwriters have to 
consider future market conditions).192 At the midstream stage, a decision to 
add defenses requires a charter amendment, which entails activating the 
flawed voting mechanism.193 Such a decision made by the scattered 
shareholders body is less likely to be informed and beneficial than a decision 
overseen by the underwriter. Third, if defenses are adopted to preserve the 
private benefits of control194 and the decision has an adverse effect on firm 
value, shareholders would want such a decision to be made at the IPO stage 
before they make their investment, not afterwards. Finally, while the decision 
at the IPO stage is made before the firm is exposed to the market for 
corporate control, it is possible that the midstream managers who are most 
aggressive in their demand to add defenses may be the ones who most fear 
takeovers due to their poor performance. Shareholders might, therefore, 
reasonably adopt a policy that prevents them from being influenced by 
managers' biased explanations down the road.  
Taken together, the above arguments shed light on the current behavior 
of institutional investors.195 These investors adopt voting protocols that 
restrict the ability of managers to add antitakeover charter provisions 
 
191 See CLARK, supra note 50, at 790-96 (discussion of shareholders’ collective action 
problems); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 86, at 66-67 (same). 
192 Id., at 32-34 (discussing “latecomer” terms). 
193 See Lucian A, Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law : The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); 
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). 
194 Bebchuk, supra note 126. 
195 Institutional investors are the most potent force among the scattered public 
shareholder body.   See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise and 
Limits of Shareholder Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811-93 (1992) (presenting institutional 
investors’ ability to monitor managers); Gordon L. Clark & Tessa M. Hebb, Pension Fund 
Corporate Engagement: The Fifth Stage of Capitalism (Working Paper, 2005) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789724 (describing the promise of the 
activism of pension funds, the leading force among institutional investors); but cf. Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, Shareholders Activism and Institutional Investors (UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-20, 2005) available at 
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=796227 (arguing that institutional investor activism is 
rare and limited and that activist investors pursue agendas not shared by and often in conflict 
with those of passive investors). 
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downstream,196 but, at the same time, take part in the IPO of firms that adopt 
defenses without any disapproval.197 
V.  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS (NON-MARKET-BASED EXPLANATIONS)
Thus far, all existing theories presented in this paper regarding the adoption 
and rejection of takeover defenses have been framed in market terms.  And, 
except for the traditional theories, which imply a highly stringent nature of the 
market, all the theories have been revealed as factors within the unified market 
explanation proposed by this paper.  It is important, however, to mention three 
alternative explanations that were raised by the authors of the three empirical 
papers on IPO-stage antitakeover trends.  These explanations are non-market 
explanations, and in this Section, I briefly describe them and contrast them with 
the market-for-antitakeover-defenses argument. 
 
A.  Daines and Klausner’s Study and the Suggestion that the Market Misprices 
Defenses 
Recall that Daines and Klausner collected data on the antitakeover 
trends of IPO-stage firms during the period between 1994 and 1997, with the 
intention of including IPOs backed by highly professional investors such as 
 
196 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 59, at 517 (discussing institutional investors’ 
voting practices). 
197 See Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover 
Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 20 (2003) (describing institutional investors’ 
indifference to defenses adopted at the IPO stage and their opposition to midstream adoption 
by seasoned firms); Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory 
Competition, 87 Va. L. Rev. 111, 126-28 (2001) (discussing institutional investors’ 
opposition to adoption of takeover defenses by way of charter amendments); John C. Coates, 
Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public 
Corporations?, Symposium: Team Production in Business Organizations, 24 J. Corp. L. 837, 
860-62 (1999) (same).  It should be noted, though, that the above description fits firms with 
dispersed ownership status. For the period preceding dispersal of ownership, the question is 
how can shareholders trust the managerial team that owns much of the stock to sustain a 
decision not to adopt shields that was made at the IPO stage? Since the empirical evidence is 
quite unambiguous regarding the adherence of even pre-dispersion stage firms to decisions 
made at the IPO stage and the fact that they do not change their charters, there are two 
possible answers to this question: One, in many firms, even before ownership becomes 
dispersed, there are powerful non-managerial shareholders (such as venture capital funds) 
that do not allow managers to deviate from the IPO bargain. Second, even if the managerial 
team is powerful enough to change the corporate charter by itself, it may be apprehensive 
about the investor rage that would ensue should the rules of the game be changed so soon 
after the public offering. 
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venture capitalists.198 They found that IPO firms diverge greatly with respect to 
their antitakeover practices, but could not explain this divergence. 
Daines and Klausner proposed the possibility, which they subsequently 
seem to refute, that the IPO process is flawed and incapable of pricing the 
harmful effects of antitakeover charter provisions.  Evidently, this is a non-
market explanation, which deviates from the prediction of the market-for- 
antitakeover-defenses explanation.  Under this non-market theory, pre-IPO 
investors, especially managers, collectively abuse the public shareholders by 
selling securities with defective features at full price. This market failure 
explanation argues against the well-established understanding of the IPO 
market’s accurately pricing corporate governance mechanisms.199 Pre-IPO 
owners, goes the Daines and Klausner suggestion, entrench themselves as 
managers by means of antitakeover charter provisions, while the market fails to 
penalize them by discounting the value of their firms for this inefficient 
behavior. 
Daines and Klausner also note, however, that their empirical findings 
cast serious doubt on this interpretation.  Indeed, although many firms adopt 
defenses, many others reject them; indeed, at least 50% of the firms in their 
sample did not adopt harsh defense measures.  If defective governing structures 
were to yield advantages for managers without harming the firm’s value, then 
all firms could be expected to use them.  Daines and Klausner therefore argue 
against the suggestion they have raised, stating, 
“This interpretation, however, is also problematic… if ATPs 
[antitakeover provisions] are not fully priced, why don’t more firms 
adopt strong ATPs?  Assuming that management would generally favor 
ATPs, all things being equal, the fact that strong ATPs are not 
universally adopted implies that there is some constraint on their 
adoption …”200 
And where Daines and Klausner conclude, the market for antitakeover 
defenses kicks in.  Daines and Klausner search for some elusive constraint that 
prevents all firms from adopting defenses.  The demand forces of the market for 
antitakeover defenses in fact impose this very constraint. The more firms that 
adopt antitakeover provisions, the more valuable it becomes to remain 
unshielded.  Eventually, at some point, the market becomes too saturated to 
adopt additional defenses. 
 
B.  Coates’ Study and the Failure of the Market for Legal Advice 
As discussed above, Coates gathered two samples of IPO firms: the first 
sample went public between 1991 and 1992 and the second from 1998.  To start 
with, Coates reiterates the Daines and Klausner findings, in identifying high 
variance among the firms that go public in relation to defense adoption.  
Coates, like Daines and Klausner, brings empirical refutation of some supply-
 
198 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 92. 
199 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8. 
200 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 113. 
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side theories that might explain why defenses are better suited to some firms 
than to others. 
Coates then offers his own explanation, which extends beyond the logic 
of the market for takeover defenses.  Specifically, he argues that the divergence 
in firm behavior stems from a failure in the market for legal advice. Coates 
found that law firms are always either pro defenses or anti defenses, in 
disregard of the different characteristics of their clients.  He therefore argues 
that lawyers’ preferences, rather than clients’ requirements, determine whether 
a firm goes public with or without defenses.  This means, according to Coates, 
that some of the law firms are simply wrong in the advice they give, and Coates 
makes it quite clear that he thinks that the optimal solution for all firms is to 
adopt takeover defenses.201 
However, Coates’ empirical findings regarding law firms’ systematic 
preferences do not contradict the logic of the market for antitakeover defenses.  
Even if Coates is right and the different characteristics of firms do not dictate 
their antitakeover defenses decision, this may simply stem from the fact that 
supply forces are weak and thus all firms derive similar benefits from adopting 
defenses or rejecting them.  Nevertheless, demand forces may still prevent all 
firms from adopting defenses, since the advantages dwindle when many firms 
opt for adoption of defenses.  At some point, with some fraction of the market 
adopting defenses, it no longer matters for any given firm whether or not it 
adopts defenses.202 Moreover, in Section IV of the article, I suggested a market 
mechanism that leads to and preservers this outcome.  It is quite possible that 
some lawyers always advise their clients to adopt defenses, while others always 
give the opposite advice, and the market sits on the point of intersection 
between demand and supply. 
Moreover, as long as this equilibrium persists, both proponents and 
opponents of defenses can, in good conscience, continue to give the same, 
uniform advice to their clients, because it does not matter if a firm is shielded or 
not. Simply put, any legal advice will do when the market is in a state of 
equilibrium.203 Interestingly, Coates mentions another empirical finding, that 
 
201 Coates has launched several attacks on the conventional academic connotation that 
takeover defenses are harmful and raise agency costs.  See, e.g., Coates, supra note 21.  And 
as Coates mentions in his work, he was a partner in the firm that is credited with the 
invention of the poison pill.  Coates, supra note 5, at 1301.   However, Coates was also 
willing to update his own beliefs when his empirical findings identified high costs for defense 
adoption, see Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 40; see also Bebchuk, Coates & 
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and 
a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885-917 (2002) (reinforcement of the 
previous study that includes a critical theoretical and empirical account of staggered boards). 
202 Note that this scenario is a bit different from the one where the supply curve is not 
flat and firms have different antitakeover preferences, in which case, only the marginal firm 
is indifferent to defenses adoption.  When firms are similar in preferences, all firms are 
indifferent, but still only some of them adopt defenses. 
203 If legal advice drives the market to a severely distorted position, then the market 
professionals will have to expose the problem. For example, the research department of an 
investment bank can expose the abnormal returns of firms that chose one tactic and thus 
recommend that new firms systematically adopt or reject defenses depending on what was 
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many lawyers craft either illegal or ineffective defenses.  In Coates’ view, this 
is an indication of both the extent to which lawyers are frequently ill-equipped 
to deal with defense issues and the fact that clients are easily persuaded to 
follow poor advice.  Ironically, minimal attention to defense issues may be 
warranted, because it may be irrelevant whether or not a firm adopts defenses 
when the market is in a state of equilibrium and thus it is beneficial not to waste 
long billable hours deliberating the issue.  As long as there are enough players 
in the market, such as underwriters, who will not tolerate substantial deviation 
from the market’s equilibrium point, lawyers can afford to remain rather 
ignorant with regard to the advantages or disadvantages of defenses. 
 
C.  Field and Karpoff’s Study and the Assertion that Managers Abuse the Pre-
IPO Investors Who Are Not Management 
As described earlier, Field and Karpoff’s sample of takeover defenses at 
the IPO stage focused on the years 1988 and 1992.204 They, too, found that 
firms diverge in attitude toward defenses.205 Interestingly, Field and Karpoff 
argue that firm heterogeneity can explain the divergent antitakeover behavior, 
but not the type of heterogeneity that is part of the supply-side forces in the 
market for antitakeover defenses.  They found that IPO firms install more 
defenses if they have managers who are not well-monitored by their non-
managerial pre-IPO investors and when the managers lack incentives to operate 
well.206 Put differently, Field and Karpoff posit that even though the market 
discounts the harmful use of defenses, pre-IPO managers nevertheless use 
defenses to their advantage.  This behavior, which takes place unless managers 
are carefully monitored, reduces the firm’s value.  In turn, it harms the pre-IPO 
investors who are not on the managing team and therefore suffer from a low 
valuation of the company without enjoying the benefits enjoyed by 
management from the adoption of defenses.  These sub-optimal results, goes 
the argument, are the consequence of a market failure in monitoring the 
managers of firms prior to their going public and can therefore also be labeled a 
non-market explanation for takeover defenses divergences. 
The two other empirical studies of takeover defenses raise some doubts 
regarding this understanding.  First, Daines and Klausner found in their sample 
that the higher the level of management ownership, the more severe the 
defenses adopted, which completely contradicts the findings of Field and 
Karpoff.207 Thus, from the Daines and Klausner perspective, the more aligned 
done by the earlier firms with these abnormal returns.  Market forces can thus overcome the 
deviation, and a state of equilibrium will prevail. 
204 Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1859. 
205 Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1884. 
206 Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1884 (“Among IPO firms, the likelihood of a 
takeover defense is positively related to managers’ compensation, board size, and whether the 
CEO is also board chairman, and negatively related to managers’ shareholdings.” ). 
207 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 109-10. Field and Karpoff’s results, on the 
other hand, are not unanimously significant in all their regressions. See the results of their 
sensitivity tests in Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1870.  
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the incentives of managers are with the interests of shareholders, the more 
likely those firms are to adopt defenses. Second, Daines and Klausner 
examined a large control sample of IPO firms with venture capital and 
professional LBO investors.208 Those firms did not have fewer defenses than 
other firms, which refutes the argument that rigorous monitoring leads to fewer 
defenses.209 Finally, Field and Karpoff argue that IPO-stage firms suffer from 
agency costs, which leads to defenses adoption.  They do, however, concede 
that these problems are not tantamount in severity to the problems experienced 
by more seasoned firms in which ownership is highly dispersed and monitoring 
of management therefore much harder.  Accordingly, Field and Karpoff stress 
that, in their sample, a much lower rate of IPO-stage firms adopted defenses 
than the rate of mature firms that adopted defenses during the 1980s.210 This 
finding, however, corresponds only with the early period of the Field and 
Karpoff sample: since then the early 1990’s, however, defense-adoption rates 
for IPO-stage firms have surged and surpassed those of mature firms.  This 
development is problematic and can hardly be aligned with the Field and 
Karpoff argument.211 
But, these concerns aside, it is interesting to note that the Field and 
Karpoff argument does not contradict the theory proposed in this paper.  Due to 
distorted managerial incentives, some firms have higher preferences for 
defenses.  In turn, the presence of many shielded targets enhances the value of 
the remaining unshielded firms, to the point where the decision-maker of the 
marginal firm is indifferent to adoption or rejection of defenses.  Diversion of 
takeover activity leads to an equalization of the pros and cons regarding being 
shielded or unshielded for the marginal firm.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The market for antitakeover defenses is a metaphor that helps to 
consolidate existing explanations for takeover defenses and formulate new 
 
208 Daines & Klausner, supra note 5, at 93. 
209 Recall that Field and Karpoff followed the firms in their sample for five years after 
the IPO stage in order to measure the impact of defenses on takeover activity and premiums. 
Although five years may be too short a period from which to draw absolute conclusions, 
many of the firms (168, or 16.5% of the sample) were acquired during this period. Recall that 
they found that takeover probability during the five-year period was 16.8% for unshielded 
firms and 11.4% for firms with at least one defense. Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1877.  
Field & Karpoff did not find, however, that defenses raise takeover premiums.  This 
seemingly contradicts the supply-side argument regarding bargaining power.  However 
demand-side forces may complement any other supply-side theories, such as the private 
benefits of control.  See supra section III.B.4.  In any event, the Field and Karpoff study 
suffers from at least one weakness, since unlike other empirical studies that focus on the 
gravity of defenses, they focused on the number of defenses, which is a crude measure of the 
potency of defenses. 
210 See Field & Karpoff, supra note 5, at 1861 tbl. II (comparison of frequencies of 
takeover defenses in IPO and seasoned firm samples). 
211 Id. at 1885 (“Since most firms raise equity capital from nonmanagerial institutions 
and individuals before the IPO stage, their equity agency problems are different from those of 
seasoned corporations only in degree, not in kind.”). 
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ones.  When reframed in market terms, traditional arguments for and against 
defenses are revealed as stringent in nature.  Other existing theories, which 
make much sense although lacking empirical verification, are unified under 
the umbrella of supply-side forces.  If the decision to go public without 
defenses is considered a decision to produce an unshielded target, then these 
supply-side explanations involve the producers.  Each of these existing 
theories concentrates on the different characteristics of issuers and shows why 
they may make some of the issuers better-suited to adopting defenses.  
Finally, the takeover defenses market] metaphor requires a supplementary 
argument, one that focuses on market willingness to pay—i.e., the forces of 
demand that have been neglected up until now in the literature. 
On the demand-side, I argued that the more firms producing unshielded 
targets (and, therefore, the fewer firms adopting defenses), the lower the price 
the market will be willing to pay for the unshielded product.  The reason for 
this is that not only do defenses prevent takeovers, they also divert takeover 
activity to unshielded targets.  Put differently, there is a downward sloping 
demand curve for unshielded targets. 
The combined forces of demand and supply may cause the market to 
reach an equilibrium in which only a fraction of the firms adopt defenses.  
This may shed some light on current empirical findings on divergent issuer 
choice in adopting defenses.  The theory put forth in this paper also yields 
some empirical predictions.  For instance, industries with extremely high 
levels of defenses may (although certainly not necessarily) be indicative of 
out-of-equilibrium cases, and changes in the defenses ratio in such industries 
should be discernible over time.  More generally, the theory presented in this 
paper suggests that the ratio of defenses in an industry should be mean-
reverting.  The market might deviate from the equilibrium and should correct 
itself when the deviation is severe.  The theory therefore also predicts that the 
recent period of higher levels of defense-adoption by IPO firms, as reported 
by Coates,212 will be followed by a period in which most IPO firms will reject 
defenses.  In any event, a more sophisticated empirical agenda is also 
warranted, which I discuss elsewhere.213 
The main normative implication of this paper lies in the fact that 
recognizing the demand forces exposes a new type of positive externality.214 
212 See Coates, supra note 5, at 1376. 
213 The essence of this empirical agenda is to derive the slope of the demand curve from 
the shifts in the supply curve over time or across market sectors (a simultaneous-equation 
empirical inquiry).  Sharon Hannes, A Demand-Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses,
J.Legal Stud. section 4.2 (forthcoming 2006) (suggesting a broader empirical agenda). 
214 Elsewhere, I suggest that a contradicting negative externality might also surface as a 
result of takeover diversion.  In a quest to expand, bidders may target even firms that are run 
efficiently.  Consequently, even a firm with perfect management performance but which is 
left unshielded and vulnerable to takeovers may be raided.  And, if takeover diversion exists, 
this fear becomes more acute when peer firms adopt defenses.  As a result, the virtues of a 
takeover market for unshielded firms may diminish as the number of potential shielded 
targets increases. See Sharon Hannes, The Hidden Virtue of Antitakeover Defenses, 24 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 1903, 1906-08 (2003). See also Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989) (discussing overpayment by bidders).  While theoretically, this 
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Firms that adopt defenses benefit their unshielded peers by creating takeover 
diversion and, in turn, higher takeover frequency and additional takeover 
premiums.  The effect of this positive externality would be to cause IPO-stage 
issuers to adopt less takeover defenses than they would otherwise.  It is 
unclear, however, if this is a positive effect from a social welfare point of 
view.  The literature has so far identified few possible negative externalities 
to the decision to adopt shields, including, for instance, harsh effects on 
employees.215 If these effects are regarded to be substantial, then society may 
have an excess of takeover defenses, and the contradictory effect exposed by 
this paper is a push in the right direction.  There are no guarantees, however, 
that the new outcome is socially optimal.  
 
negative externality explanation is sound, I doubt if it is substantial.  Unlike the positive 
externality that is described in this paper, which takes place mostly within one industry 
section, this effect may run across industries and therefore dissolve. 
215 Shleifer & Summers, supra note 142. 
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APPENDIX 1
To focus its inquiry, the paper analyzes a stylized model and makes some 
simplifying assumptions to emphasize the demand side of takeover defenses, 
i.e., the price the market is willing to pay for unshielded targets.  First, in order 
to abstract away from supply-side considerations that are based on the 
heterogeneity of firms, I assume that all firms are similar at the stage that they 
go public.  Therefore, they all have to forego similar levels of benefits when 
going public without defenses.  Second, I assume that the potential benefits of 
defenses are derived only from the ability of shielded firms to extract high 
takeover premiums from bidders (but any other benefit, such as the ability to 
protect private benefits of control, would lead to similar conclusions).  Finally 
and most important, a key feature of the model is that there are too few 
potential bidders in the industry to guarantee an auction for all targets.  
Diversion of takeover activity will lead to a rise in the stock price of unshielded 
targets only if one assumes, as I do, that the bidders pool is limited so that an 
auction would not necessarily emerge without the diverted activity (or, 
alternatively, that the diverted opportunity is highly precious). I offer support 
for the plausibility of this key assumption in the discussion section. 
Now consider a framework with two potential takeover targets, T1 and T2,
and two bidders, B1 and B2.216 I model the adoption of antitakeover mechanisms 
and their effects on subsequent bidding behavior as a two-period game.  In the 
first period, the two target firms decide whether to adopt defenses.  Bidders 
observe this decision and decide in the second period on a bid for the target 
companies.  
In this simple model, a firm consists of a shareholder and a manager.  The 
shareholder can take one of two actions: she can decide to delegate decision-
making regarding a takeover bid to the manager by adopting harsh takeover 
shields (action S) or she can choose to hold on to that power (action NS).  The 
manager holds a certain share H in the firm’s stock.  To abstract away from 
standard agency problems, I assume that the manager has no disutility of effort.  
However, the manager incurs a cost c from losing her job if the firm is taken 
over by a bidder in the second period (further on, this fixed cost will be 
replaced by managerial private benefits that fluctuate with the level of exposure 
to the market for corporate control).  Let us also assume for simplicity that the 
bidders cannot “bribe” the manager to accept an offer with a low premium, nor 
will they offer the manager to hold on to her position after the takeover.  This 
implies that the manager will consent to a merger only if the premium p paid by 
a bidder to the stockholders of the company is sufficiently large. That is:217 
216 The main results of this simple model of two bidders and two targets remain in a 
setting of n bidders and m targets as long as one sticks with the assumption that there are not 
enough bidders (or bidding opportunities) to promise an auction for all targets.  For a model 
with a large finite number of bidders and targets, see Sharon Hannes & Markus M. Mobius, 
ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: DIFFERENCES IN ANTITAKEOVER DEFENSES AMONGST SIMILAR 
FIRMS (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
217 Assume, for example, that the manager holds only 1% of the company’s stock but 
derives $10,000,000 from holding on to her position.  If this manager has complete discretion 
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(1) p H ^ c
The manager will reject some takeover bids in the second period, which, 
though profitable to the owner, are costly to the manager.  However, the owner, 
in turn, credibly commits to reject low takeover bids in the second period by 
irreversibly delegating the decision-making power to the manager.  Therefore, 
the owner might implement an antitakeover mechanism in the first period for 
strategic reasons.  
There is ex-ante uncertainty about the bidders’ valuations of each of the 
two target firms.  With probability q, target firm Ti has a valuation (beyond the 
stand-alone value of the firm) of w > J for Bidder Bi and a valuation J for 
Bidder B j (j K i).218 With probability 1 – q, target firm Ti has a valuation 
beyond the stand-alone value of the firm of J for both bidders.  This setup 
captures the idea that bidders can derive private benefits (for instance, synergy 
effects) from taking over a target firm, due to a unique characteristic that each 
target may develop.  Both w and J are private values for the bidders beyond the 
stand-alone value of the firm.  This also means that a bidder can pay a premium 
of up to either v or w, as applicable.  I also assume that each bidder can take 
over no more than one company. 
The second period is subdivided into three sub-periods.  In sub-period 2.1, 
the uncertainty about the bidders’ valuations is resolved, and they become 
common knowledge.  In sub-period 2.2, Bidder Bi makes bids bijL 0 for each of 
the two target firms j.219 In sub-period 2.3, the target firms decide whether to 
accept a takeover bid and payoffs are realized.  
I look for sub-game perfect equilibria of this game and solve through 
backward induction.  In the second period, we have to distinguish between 
three possible cases. 
 
Case I: Neither firm adopts defenses.  In this case, both bidders will submit 
zero bids, regardless of their valuations.220 We should recall that the bid is 
defined as the amount exceeding the stand-alone value of the target, which 
means that the bidder in this case offers the shareholders only the market value 
of the shares, without any premium. To avoid competition that would drive 
prices up, assume that Bidder Bj waits until Bidder Bi bids for one target, and 
only then does Bj place its bid for the other target, and that Bidder Bi avoids 
bidding for a target that Bidder Bj prefers.221 Hence, both targets will accept 
 
whether or not to accept a bid, she will reject an offer that consists of a premium of less than 
one billion dollars.  The manager would receive only 1% of the premium, while foregoing all 
the benefits attached to her position in the company. 
218 And if Ti has a valuation of w for Bi, while Tj has a valuation of w for Bj, then Bj K
Bi. 
219 We do not have to allow bidders not to bid for a company, because they can always 
bid 0 for a target and bidding is assumed to be costless.  Remember that b=0 means that 
bidders pay only the market value of the target, without sharing its synergy gains. 
220 In reality, these results stem from the fact that dispersed shareholders do not have 
the ability to negotiate with the bidders and therefore cannot entertain competition that could 
drive the price up. 
221 This means that: (a) Bidder Bi will place a bid for its preferred target (if such a 
target exists); (b) Bidder Bi will not bid for a target that Bidder Bj prefers (if such a target 
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one bid each, for zero premiums. Note that the bidders  appropriate the entire 
surplus.  
 
Case II: Both firms adopt defenses. In this case, either target firm can be 
acquired by a bidder only if the bidder’s valuation (beyond the stand-alone 
value of the firm) is greater than c/H. I assume that c/H <w. Otherwise, the 
antitakeover mechanism will prevent all takeovers, which cannot be in the 
interest of the owner. Since for each of the targets, there is a probability q of
being given the valuation of w by one of the bidders (with said bidder giving a 
low valuation for the other target), each target will receive one bid bij= c/H with 
a probability of q.
Case III: Only one firm adopts defenses. Without loss of generality, 
assume that T1 is protected.  To make this case interesting, let us assume that 
c/H > J. This implies that a bidder will attempt a takeover only if it makes a 
high valuation of the target firm.  Otherwise, the bidder will prefer to bid for 
the second firm.  In this case, both bidders will compete for target T2 with a bid 
of bi2 = J, and T2 will be sold to B2 for a premium of p= J.222 
Since we have solved the equilibria of the second period sub-games (i.e., 
the three different cases), we can present the decision-making problem of the 
target firms as a two-by-two game in the first period.  Recall that the 
shareholders of each target firm can take two possible actions: to either adopt 
takeover shields (S) or retain control (NS). 
 
exists), but, rather, will bid for the other target; and (c) if both (a) and (b) bidding rules do not 
ascertain the identity of the target to bid for (i.e., no target developed any appealing 
characteristic for either bidder), then Bidder Bi will randomize between both targets.  
Remember that there is no conflict between (a) and (b) bidding rules because, under the 
game’s definitions, a target cannot develop a characteristic that is appealing to both bidders. 
222 Any price below J does not achieve a Nash equilibrium, because both firms have an 
incentive to bid p+O. If B2 has a low valuation, the target can actually go to either bidder.  If 
B2 has a high valuation, it will obtain the target for certain (but will not have to offer more 
than v, since the target does not have takeover defenses). 
T1
NS    S 
 
NS 
 
T2
S
if q< 1 h N h i (S, NS) and (NS,S)
0, 0 (1-q)v, qc/`
qc/`, (1-q)v qc/`, qc/`
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The game has the unique equilibrium (S,S) if q > 1/(1+c/ac) and two Nash 
equilibria (S, NS) and (NS, S) if q < 1/(1+c/av).  The outcome of the simple 
model is that for intermediate values of q, defenses prevent some takeovers, but 
extract a high price from high-valuation bidders.223 Shareholders’ optimal 
strategy is then dependent on the probability q of finding a high-valuation 
bidder in the second period.  If that probability is high, then both target firms 
will prefer takeover defenses, since the shareholders of the target can extract 
high rents from the potential bidder. 
We will see firms adopting both strategies if the probability of finding a 
high-valuation bidder is not too high (in particular, q < 1/(1+c/av).  In such an 
environment, some firms can benefit from not adopting takeover defenses 
because of the resultant competition among bidders.  
This competition is the main lesson of the simple model, which 
demonstrates the fact that defenses not only prevent some takeover activity, but 
also divert some of it to unshielded firms.  The simple model uses a limited 
framework of two targets and two bidders, but it can be extended to a large 
number of firms without a loss of generality, as long as there are not enough 
bidders to guarantee an auction for any single target.224 Every firm that adopts 
defenses increases the chances that a relatively low-valuation bidder will not be 
able to take it over, and this, in turn, increases the probability of competition 
emerging for unshielded targets.  Therefore, the more firms that adopt defenses, 
the higher the benefits to their unshielded peers. 
 
223 Put differently, shareholders will choose to implement antitakeover mechanisms if 
the manager has relatively few incentives to use them (c is low).  If c is too high, the manager 
will prevent all takeovers.  In this case, the firm will choose against using any takeover 
defenses.  
224 See Hannes & Mobius, supra note 216. 
